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Do higher wages lead to more automation innovation? To answer this ques-
tion, we first use the frequency of certain keywords in patent text to create a new
measure of automation innovation in machinery. We show that our measure is cor-
related with a reduction in routine tasks in a cross-sectoral analysis in the US. We
combine macroeconomic data from 41 countries and information on geographical
patent history to build firm-specific measures of low- and high-skill wages. In a
firm-level panel analysis, we find that an increase in low-skill wages leads to more
automation innovation with an elasticity between 2 and 5. Placebo regressions
show that the effect is specific to automation innovations. Finally, we focus on a
specific labor market shock, the German Hartz reforms, and show that they re-
duced automation innovations by those non-German firms relatively more exposed
to Germany.
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1 Introduction
Do higher wages lead to more labor-saving innovations? And if so, by how much? At
a time of fast progress in automation technologies and of political campaigns pushing
for higher minimum wages, answering these questions is of central importance as the
endogeneity of automation innovations affects both the cost of such policy intervention
and their long-term effects. Our paper is the first to establish a causal effect of an
increase in labor costs on automation innovations at the firm level.
Answering these question requires overcoming two challenges: identifying automation
innovations and finding a source of exogenous variation in labor costs from the perspec-
tive of innovating firms. To overcome the first challenge, we develop a new classification
of automation patents. We think of automation innovations as innovations which allow
for the replacement of workers with machines in certain tasks. We focus on patents in
machinery to which our identification strategy is ideally suited. Our classification fol-
lows a two-step procedure where we first classify technology categories (IPC and CPC
codes) using patent text and then patents using their technology categories. This new
classification presents a certain number of advantages: it is transparent, it covers a wide
range of automation technologies and it can be built at a highly disaggregated sectoral
level. Furthermore, we reproduce the cross-sectoral analysis of Autor, Levy and Mur-
nane (2003) but adding our measure of automation. We find that in the United States,
sectors which use equipment with a high share of automation saw a large decrease in
routine tasks.
At the country level, technology and wages are co-determined. To find exogenous
variation in labor costs, we exploit the fact that automation innovators are often equip-
ment manufacturers which sell their machines to downstream firms in various countries.
We conduct two separate exercises. First, we expand on the methodology of Aghion,
Dechezleprêtre, Hémous, Martin and Van Reenen (2016, henceforth ADHMV) and use
variation in country-level wages. We rely on the PATSTAT database, which contains
close to the universe of patents. For each firm, we compute the geographical distribution
of its machinery patents pre-sample, which we use as a measure for the distribution of
the firm’s international exposure. We then compute firm-specific weighted averages of
low- and high-skill labor costs using country-level data. These firm-specific labor costs
(referred to as wages for simplicity) proxy for the average labor cost paid by the down-
stream firms of the innovating firms. As a result, for, say, two German firms, we identify
the effect of an increase in, say, US wages, on automation innovations, by comparing how
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much more automation innovations increase for the firm which has the higher market
exposure to the US.
We conduct our main analysis over the sample period 1997-2011 and use wage data
for 41 countries with automation patents for 3,341 firms. We find a substantial effect of
wages on automation innovations: higher low-skill wages lead to more automation inno-
vations with an elasticity between 2 and 5 depending on specification. Higher high-skill
wages tend to reduce automation, a finding in line with the capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis (Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante, 2000). Our results are robust to
the inclusion of country-year fixed effects for the innovator home country and the exclu-
sion of the home country from the wage variable. Importantly, our results are specific
to automation innovations and do not extend to other innovations in machinery.
In a second exercise, we focus on a specific labor market shock, namely the Hartz
reforms in Germany in 2002-2004. The Hartz reforms are credited with increasing labor
supply and reducing labor costs notably for low-skill workers. We analyze the effect
of the Hartz reforms and find that they reduced the relative amount of automation
innovation undertaken by foreign firms highly exposed to Germany, both in levels and
relative to non-automation innovations in machinery.
The theoretical argument that higher wages should lead to more labor-saving tech-
nology adoption or innovation is well-understood (e.g. Zeira, 1998). In Hémous and
Olsen (forthcoming) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a), wages affect the direction of
innovation which can take the form of automation or the creation of new tasks.
There is an extensive empirical literature on the effects of technological change on
wages and employment,1 but the literature on the reverse question is much more limited.
A few papers show that labor market conditions affect labor-saving technology adoption
in agriculture (Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014, and Clemens, Lewis and Postel, 2018), or
manufacturing (Lewis, 2011). Lordan and Neumark (2018) find that minimum wage
hikes displace workers in automatable jobs. Unlike these papers our focus is on innovation
instead of adoption. This matters because the economic drivers of innovation may differ
from those of adoption: innovation may respond differently to macroeconomic variables
such as wages; and knowledge spillovers are likely to play a greater role.
Regarding innovation, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b) find a positive correlation in
1See e.g. Autor et. al. (2003), Autor and Dorn (2013) or Gaggl and Wright (2017) for IT, Doms,
Dunne and Totske (1997) for factory automation, Graetz and Michaels (2017) or Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2020) for robots, Mann and Püttmann (2018) or Bessen, Goos, Salomons and van den Berge (2019)
for broader measures of automation.
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cross-country regressions between aging and patenting in robotics and numerical control
(though their main focus is on adoption). Our paper differs in three ways: first, we
build a broader measure of automation innovation in machinery; second, we are inter-
ested in the effect of all wage variations not just those arising from demographic trends;
and third and most importantly, we conduct our analysis at the firm level instead of
the country-industry. Bena and Simintzi (2019) show that firms with a better access
to the Chinese labor market decrease their share of process innovations after the 1999
U.S.-China trade agreement.2 Andersson, Karadja and Prawitz (2020) look at the effect
of emigration to the US in the 19thcentury in Sweden and find that more exposed mu-
nicipalities experienced an increase in innovation (but they do not identify automation
innovations). In a paper subsequent to ours, Danzer, Feuerbaum and Gaessler (2020)
exploit German immigrant settlement policy to show that increases in labor supply dis-
courage local automation innovation, while we exploit firm-level variation and focus on
the effect of labor cost on global innovation.
A large literature shows that the direction of innovation is endogenous in other con-
texts (e.g. Acemoglu and Linn, 2004, and Popp, 2002). Here, we build on ADHMV,
who use firm-level variations in gas prices to show that higher gas prices lead firms in
the auto industry to engage more in clean and less in dirty innovations.3
In contemporaneous work, Mann and Püttmann (2020) use machine-learning tech-
niques to classify automation patents and Webb (2020) uses a dictionary approach similar
to ours to identify robot, software and artificial intelligence patents. We compare our
approaches below.
Section 2 contains our first contribution: a classification of automation technologies.
Section 3 introduces a simple model to motivate the analysis. Section 4 describes the
data and our empirical strategy. Section 5 contains the results of the main analysis on
the effect of wages on automation innovations. Section 6 discusses the event study of
the Hartz reforms. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix provides additional robustness
checks and details on our methodology.
2Process innovations and automation innovations are not the same: some process innovations reduce
other costs than labor (say, materials costs) and many automation innovations are product innovations
(a new industrial robot is a product innovation for its maker).
3Three other papers have used ADHMV’s methodology: Noailly and Smeets (2015) on innovation
in electricity generation, Coelli, Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2020) on the effect of trade policy on inno-
vation and Aghion, Bénabou, Martin and Roulet (2020) on the role of environmental preferences and
competition in innovation in the auto industry. We methodologically extend this work by including
country-year fixed effects and separating the foreign variables.
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2 Classifying Automation Patents
In this section, we describe the patent data and our method for classifying automation
patents. We then show that our measure of automation predicts a decline in routine
tasks (reproducing the analysis of Autor et. al., 2003).
2.1 Our approach to classify patents
Our goal is to identify automation innovations in machinery: that is innovations embed-
ded in equipment goods, such as machine tools or robots, which allow for the replacement
of workers in certain tasks. Non-automation innovations, in contrast, may improve en-
ergy efficiency, reduce the costs of producing certain machines or increase reliability. We
employ a dictionary method on patent data and proceed in three steps: i) We use the
existing literature to identify keywords related to automation. ii) For each technology
category in machinery (based on the IPC and CPC codes in patent data), we compute
the share of patents at the European Patent Office (EPO), which contain one of our
automation keywords. We use this measure to classify technology categories as automa-
tion or not. iii) We then classify worldwide patents as automation or not depending on
whether they belong to an automation technology category.
This strategy of first classifying technology categories and then patents has two ad-
vantages over classifying patents directly. First, it allows us to include non-EPO patents
in our analysis, for which our main data source (PATSTAT) does not have the text.4
More generally, other researchers can now use our technology category classification
to classify patents without text and future patents. Second, the IPC and CPC codes
(henceforth C/IPC codes),5 which we use to define our technology categories, are by
themselves informative of the characteristics of patents. The particular wording of a
patent is also a signal of these characteristics but patents are written in different styles,
and rarely expand on the purpose of the invention, so that the same innovation can often
be described with or without using our keywords. Conversely, if a patent uses one of our
keywords but does not belong to any C/IPC code where this is common, the inclusion
of this keyword is frequently uninformative about the nature of the innovation. That
4To give an idea of the increase in sample, over the period 1997-2011 there are 3.19 million patent
families with patent applications in at least two offices (a condition we will impose in our main analysis).
Among those only around 740, 000 have an EPO patent with a description in English.
5The IPC is the International Patent Classification and the CPC the Cooperative Patent Classifi-
cation used by the USPTO and the EPO. The CPC is an extension of the IPC and contains around
250,000 codes in its most disaggregated form.
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is, the wording of a given patent is a weak signal of whether that patent corresponds to
automation but the combined wording of many patents gives a strong signal of whether
a technological code corresponds to automation. Therefore, our strategy assumes that
technology categories are a better signal of whether a patent is an automation patent
or not than the presence of our keywords. Yet, as we do not know which technology
categories correspond to automation, we use the text of a subset of patents to classify
these first. As a matter of fact, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
offers on its website a simple tool based on a similar principle: a search engine allows
one to identify up to 5 IPC codes most likely to correspond to a set of keywords using
the text of the patents in its database.
Alternatively, we could have read and classified a subset of patents and then used
machine-learning techniques to classify other patents or technology categories based on
patent text. This is the procedure in Mann and Püttmann (2018), whose results we
discuss in Section 2.4 and Appendix A.3. Relying on keywords instead of a training set
of patents presents several advantages. First, manually classifying patents as automation
is a difficult task which cannot be easily systematized and outsourced: often looking at
a single patent in isolation is not enough, and one needs to look at several patents
within the same technological group to find patterns suggesting that a patent is likely
an automation patent. Second, patents are written in a technical language and do not
primarily discuss the goal of an innovation, so that only a few words within the text are
informative and a machine-learning algorithm would require a very large training set.
Third, by using a few keywords instead of a large training set, our approach is more
transparent, easily replicable and modifiable and, as researchers, we have fewer degrees
of freedom since we pick most of our keywords from the literature.
2.2 Patent data
We use two patent databases maintained by the EPO. For most of our empirical analysis,
we use the World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) from Autumn 2018 which
contains the bibliographical information of patents from 90 patent-issuing authorities
(covering nearly all patents in the world) but not the text of individual patents. Since
text analysis is essential to our approach, we supplement with the EP full-text database
from 2018, which contains the full text of EPO patent applications.
PATSTAT allows us to identify “patent families”, a set of patent applications across
different patent offices which represent the same innovation. For each patent family, we
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Table 1: Choice of automation keywords
Keywords Comments Source
Automat* Automation, automatization
or automat* at least 5 times
Robot* Not surgical or medical DDT and AR
Numerical Control CNC or numeric* control* or (NC in the same sentence as secondary words) DDT and AR
Computer-aided design DDT
  and manufacturing CAD or (CAM and not "content addressable memory") in same sentence as secondary words
Flexible manufacturing DDT
Programmable logic Programmable logic control or [PLC and not (powerline or "power line")] DDT
  control
3D printer "3D print*" or "additive manufacturing" or "additive layer manufacturing" Own
Labor Including laborious Own
Secondary words Machine or manufacturing or equipment or apparatus or machining
Computer-aided/-assisted/-supported in the same patent as secondary words
Own / Doms, 
Dunne and Troske 
(DDT) / Acemoglu 
and Restrepo (AR)or (automat* or autonomous) with (secondary words or warehouse  or operator  or arm or 
convey* or handling or inspect* or knitting or manipulat*  or regulat* or sensor or storage 
or store or vehicle system or weaving or welding) in the same sentence at least twice
Notes: "In the same sentence as control words" refers to at least one control word. Keywords include i) natural adjacent words (i.e. numerical control
includes NC, numerically controlled and numeric control), ii) British/American spelling (i.e. labour/labor) and iii) hyphenated adjectives (i.e. computer aided
/ computer-aided design). We added words in italics, the others come from AR or DDT. See Appendix for details.
know the date of first application (which we use as the year of an innovation), the patent
offices where the patent is applied for, the identity of the applicants and the inventors
and the number of citations received by the patent family. To identify the technological
characteristics of patents we use their C/IPC codes. Importantly each patent usually
has several C/IPC codes. The C/IPC codes form a hierarchical classification systems.
Certain types of technologies (for instance fossil fuel engines) can readily be identified
to existing groupings of C/IPC codes. Such a grouping does not exist for automation
and our goal here is to create one.
2.3 Choosing automation keywords
To tie our hands, we choose most of our keywords from the automation technologies
identified in Doms, Dunne and Troske (DDT, 1997) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (AR,
2018b) and complement with a few additional words as described below.6 In fact, most
of our search terms (for simplicity “keywords”) correspond to the co-occurrence of our
several words in the same sentence or patent, or the repetition of these words a sufficient
number of times. Table 1 describes the list of our search terms together with their origin.
6Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997) measure automation using the Survey of Manufacturing Technology
(SMT) from 1988 and 1993 conducted by the US Census. The survey asked firms about their use of
certain automation and information technologies. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b) include imports of
automation technology and associate specific HS-categories from Comtrade with automation technology.
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We have eight categories of keywords. Five of these, robot*, numerical control,
computer-aided design and manufacturing, flexible manufacturing and programmable
logic control are automation technologies in DDT or AR. Simply applying these words
may result in false positives. For instance “NC” can refer to either “numerical control”
or “North Carolina”. To address this issue, we require that these words are either in the
same patent or the same sentence as a list of secondary words, such as machinery or
equipment, which indicate that the text describes a machine. Furthermore, we add “au-
tomation” and “automatization”. The stem “automat*” gather too many false positives
such as “automatic transmission”. We resolve this in two ways: either by restricting at-
tention to patents where the frequency is 5 or more or by combining automat* with our
secondary words or other words which largely come from technologies described in DDT
or AR and often describe tasks (such as manipulat*, regulat* or inspect*). We count
patents where automat* and one of these words appear in the same sentence at least
twice. Finally, we add 3D printing, which was in its infancy when DDT was written,
and “labor” which often indicates that an innovation reduces labor costs. The most im-
portant keywords are those associated with “automat*” (see Appendix A.2) and Section
5.6 shows that our main results are robust to only using those.
2.4 Automation technology categories and patents
Defining machinery C/IPC codes. We base our classification on the set of EPO
patent applications from 1978 till 2018 with a description in English (1,538,370 patent
applications), which we denote ΩEPO. We use the keywords to associate technology
categories, and not patents directly, to automation. These technology categories are
defined as: 6-digit C/IPC codes, all pairs of 4-digit C/IPC codes and, inspired by As-
chhoff et al. (2010), pairs combining the union of the 3 digit codes G05 and G06 with
any 4-digit C/IPC codes.7 The code G05 corresponds to “controlling; regulating” and
G06 to “computing; calculating; counting” and they use these combinations to identify
advanced manufacturing technologies. We restrict attention to categories which contain
at least 100 patents (we group 6-digit codes with the same 4-digit code and less than
7Technically, the structure of the C/IPC classification is as follows: C/IPC “classes” have 3 digit
codes (for instance B25: “hand tools; portable power-driven tools; handles for hand implements; work-
shop equipment and manipulators”), “subclasses” have 4 digit codes (for instance B25J: “manipulators;
chambers provided with manipulation devices”), main groups have 5 to 7 digit codes (for instance B25J
9: “programme-controlled manipulators”). In the following, we slightly abuse language and refer to
classes, subclasses and main groups as 3 digit, 4 digit and 6 digit codes respectively.
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100 patents in ΩEPO in common artificial 6 digit codes).
Our keywords are best associated with automation in equipment and we accordingly
restrict attention to C/IPC codes which belong to certain technological fields. There
are 34 technological fields (see Figure A.1) and we focus on “machine tools”, “handling”,
“textile and paper machines”and“other special machines”with some adjustments, which
we refer to as “machinery” patents (we use machinery and equipment interchangeably).8
This leaves us with 1009 6-digit C/IPC codes. For pairs of 4 digit C/IPC codes or
pairings of 4 digit C/IPC codes with G05 or G06 we classify them as belonging to
machinery if at least a 4 digit code belongs to that field.
Formally, a patent p is associated with a set of C/IPC codes Cp recorded at a highly
disaggregated level. Define the functions S3(Cp) which extracts the set of unique 3
digit codes in Cp; S4(Cp) which extracts the set of unique 4 digit codes and S6(Cp)
which extracts the set of unique 6-digit codes (grouping 6-digit codes with less than 100
patents in ΩEPO at the 4 digit level). Further, define the function m4(c4) which takes
the value 1 if a 4 digit C/IPC code belongs to the machinery technological fields and
0 otherwise and similarly m6(c6) for a 6-digit code. We then define the broad set of
machinery technology categories of a patent p, M̃T p as
M̃T p = {c6 ∈ S6 (Cp) |m6(c6) = 1}
∪ {{c4, c′4}|c4, c′4 ∈ S4 (Cp) ∧ c4 6= c′4 ∧ (m4 (c4) = 1 ∨m4 (c′4) = 1)}
∪ {{c3, c4}|{c3, c4} ∈ {S3 (Cp) , S4 (Cp)} ∧m4 (c4) = 1 ∧ c3 ∈ {G05, G06}} .
We exclude technological categories with less than 100 patents in ΩEPO and denote
the remaining set MTp. The overall set of machinery technology categories is MT =
∪p∈ΩEPOMTp.
Defining automation C/IPC codes. A patent is also associated with a text Tp,for
each keyword category (automat*, robot, CNC, etc.) we define functions kautomat∗(Tp),
krobot(Tp), k
CNC(Tp), etc. which take value 1 if one of the associated keyword is in the text
8We exclude F41 and F42 which correspond to weapons and ammunition and are in “other special
machines”. Otherwise drones and missiles show up as a highly automated technology. Moreover,
we include B42C which corresponds to machines for book production and B07C which corresponds to
machines for postal sorting as both correspond to equipment technologies and contain 6-digit codes with
a high prevalence of automation keywords; the 6-digit code G05B19 which corresponds to “programme-
control systems” and contains a large number of computer numerically controlled machine tool patents
without C/IPC from the machine tools technological field; and the 6-digit code B62D65 which deals with
engine manufacturing even though the rest of the B62D code deals with the vehicle parts themselves.
We verify that these additional codes do not qualitatively affect our results.
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Table 2: Examples of 6-digit C/IPC codes in machinery
Code Description # patents Any Rank Robot Automat* CNC labor
B25J5 Manipulators mounted on wheels or on carriages 504 0.91 1 0.87 0.27 0.01 0.1
B25J9 Programme-controlled manipulators. 2809 0.86 4 0.79 0.29 0.07 0.08
B23Q15 
Automatic control or regulation of feed movement, 
cutting velocity or position of tool or work.
591 0.79 7 0.09 0.36 0.65 0.06
A01J7 Accessories for milking machines or devices. 395 0.77 9 0.62 0.52 0 0.1
G05B19 Programme-control systems. 7133 0.7 16 0.22 0.39 0.25 0.08
B65G1 
Storing articles, individually or in orderly arrangement, 
in warehouses or magazines
1064 0.58 29 0.18 0.46 0.01 0.11
B23P6 Restoring or reconditioning objects. 613 0.26 266 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.09
A01B63
Lifting or adjusting devices or arrangements for 
agricultural machines or implements.
264 0.24 306 0.01 0.2 0 0.04
B66D3 Portable or mobile lifting or hauling appliances 215 0.13 677 0.02 0.07 0 0.06
High prevalence
Low prevalence
Note: Prevalence of automation keywords for a few 6 digit C/IPC codes. ``Any'' is the share of patents with any of the keywords. ``Rank'' is the rank of the code among
1009 6-digit C/IPC codes in machinery with at least 100 patents. ``Robot'' , ``Automat*'', ``CNC'' and ``labor'' are the shares of patents with at least one keyword from
these categories.






which takes value 1 if any of the automation keywords are present. For all machinery
technology category t ∈ MT ,we define the prevalence of automation keywords p(t) as







We similarly define the prevalence of specific keyword categories. We extensively checked
the C/IPC codes and sampled patents from each category to ensure that the procedure
delivered reasonable results and adjusted the keywords accordingly. However, we never
modified the classification after carrying out any of our regressions.
Table 2 gives some examples of 6-digit C/IPC codes in machinery with their preva-
lence of automation keywords p(t) and their rank according that measure. It also shows
the prevalence of the most important subcategories (automat*, robots, CNC and labor).
C/IPC codes associated with robotics (B25J) have the highest prevalence numbers with
up to 91% patents in B25J5 which contain at least one of the keywords. There are
also codes associated with machine tools at the top of the distribution such as B23Q15
and codes associated with devices used in the agricultural sector such as A01J7. The
last three C/IPC codes are examples with a low prevalence of automation keywords:
machine-tools and processes for repairing or reconditioning objects (B23P6), devices
typically mounted on tractors (A01B63), and lifting or hauling appliances such as hoists
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Figure 1: Prevalence of automation keywords for C/IPC 6 digit codes in machinery
(B66D3). The table also shows that the different sub-measures do not capture the same
technologies: the robotic codes are ranked highly thanks to their share of patents with
the word “robot”, B23Q15 is high because a lot of patents contain words related to CNC,
and B65G1, because a lot of patents contain words associated with automation directly.
Figure 1 gives the histogram of the prevalence of automation keywords for all C/IPC
6 digit codes in machinery. It shows that most C/IPC codes have a low prevalence
of automation keywords but a few codes have a very high value. Appendix A.2 gives
additional statistics on the prevalence measures.
We define automation technology categories as those with a prevalence measure above
some threshold. As our baselines, we choose thresholds at the 90th and 95th percentiles of
distribution of the 6 digit code distribution (within machinery), which are given by 0.386
and 0.477, respectively.9 Therefore a technology category t belongs to the set of auto90
categories T 90 if p(t) > 0.386 and to the set of auto95 category T 95 if p(t) > 0.477. We
then define a patent as an automation patent if it belongs to at least one automation
technology category. That is we classify a patent family p from the PATSTAT dataset
ΩPATSTAT as an auto90 patent if ∃tp ∈ MTp such that tp ∈ T 95, and similarly for an
auto90 patent. Note that close to 80% of automation patents are identified by the 6
digit alone (see Appendix A.2).10
9Choosing different thresholds is easy and we investigate how robust our results are in Section 5.6.
10In Appendix A.2.3, we show that the technology categories with a high prevalence of automation
keywords remain the same throughout the period considered. In particular, the correlation between the
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Figure 2: Example of an automation patent
Figure 2 shows an automated storage cabinet patent. We classify it as automation
because it contains the 6 digit code B65G 1 which has a high prevalence measure (0.58,
see Table 2). This patent itself contains several keywords: a sentence with the words
“automatic” and “storing,” and another sentence with “robot”. Appendix Figure A.2
shows an automation patent of a similar storage cabinet that belongs to the same C/IPC
code but does not contain any keywords and still describes a labor-saving innovation.
The supplemental material on our website provides more examples.
Comparison with Mann and Püttmann (2018). Mann and Püttmann (2018)
also classify patents as automation versus non-automation. Our approaches differ in
three ways. First, they classify all patents while we focus on machinery. Second, they
manually classify a training set and use machine learning to classify US patents in a given
period, while we identify technology categories thanks to a dictionary method, so that
we (or others) can classify any patent in machinery. Third, they define as automation
“a device that carries out a process independently of human intervention”, while we seek
to identify innovations that replace workers in existing tasks. Therefore, they classify
prevalence measures computed for the first half of the sample and the second half is 0.92.
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a number of patents related to elevators and printing machines as automation patents,
which we do not (see Appendix A.3 where we compare the two approaches in details).11
2.5 Trends in automation innovations
We generally restrict attention to patent families with applications in at least two coun-
tries (referred to as biadic patents). Several studies (e.g. De Rassenfosse et al., 2013,
and Dechezleprêtre, Ménière and Mohnen, 2017),) have shown that such patents are
of higher quality than others.12 Focusing on biadic patents is also consistent with our
empirical strategy which relies on firms’ exposure to international markets.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of automation biadic patent families. Panel (a) shows
that worldwide the share of automation patents in machinery slightly declined between
the mid1980s (9.5% in 1985 for auto95) and the mid1990s (7.6% in 1994 for auto95)
before increasing quickly (reaching 18.9% in 2015 for auto95 in 2015). Appendix Figure
A.3 shows that auto95 patents represent 2.7% of all patents in 2015, a share that has
doubled since 1997. It also reports the raw numbers of auto90 and auto95 patents.
Figure 3.b shows the trends for auto95 by applicant nationality. The trend for Japan
is somewhat distinct: it is initially considerably higher, but declines in the 80s and 90s
before picking up in the 2000s though slower than in the other countries. Germany has
the highest automation share in 2015.
2.6 Automation and routine tasks
Autor et. al. (2003) (henceforth ALM) show that computerization has been associated
with a decrease in routine tasks at the industry level on U.S. data from 1960 to 1998.
Here, we briefly analyze how our measure of automation relates to routinization, in part
as a way to validate our measure of automation before focusing on our main topic: the
effect of wages on induced automation innovation.
11Bessen and Hunt (2007) also use keywords to identify software patents. Webb (2020) focuses on
matching three technologies (robotics, software and AI) to the occupations that they may replace. To
identify the associated patents, he also uses keywords: he uses the algorithm of Bessen and Hunt (2007)
for software patents, while robotics patents are defined as those with “robot” or “manipulat” in the title
or abstract but exclude the CPC classes A61 or B01 (to avoid surgical robots). We instead focus on all
automation innovation in machinery and since our classification is available at the C/IPC level, it can
easily be used and extended by other researchers.
12We count applications and not granted patents because in certain patent offices, notably Japan, a
patent is only formally granted if the rights of the applicant are challenged. To restrict attention to
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(b) Share of automation patents (auto95) in ma-
chinery by applicant’s nationality.
Figure 3: Share of automation patents in machinery for biadic families.
As ALM, we run industry level regressions of the type:
∆Tjkτ = β0 + βC∆Cj + βautautjτ . (1)
∆Tjkτ represents the change in tasks of type k in industry j during period τ and ∆Cj
is the measure of the change of computerization in sector j (it is computed over the
years 1984-1997 and used for all time periods τ). autjτ is our patent-based measure of
automation intensity in sector j, period τ . We do not first-difference this measure since
patenting is already a measure of the flow of knowledge. We take our task measures
directly from ALM, and therefore consider 5 types of tasks: nonroutine analytic, non-
routine interactive, routine cognitive, routine manual and nonroutine manual. ∆Tjkτ
is measured as 10 times the annual within-industry change in task input measured in
percentile of the 1960 task distribution.
To construct autjτ , we allocate patents in machinery to their sector of use, focusing
here on USPTO granted patents. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano and Shu (2020) match
USPTO patents with firm-level data from Compustat and thereby provide detailed sec-
toral information for corporate patents. We use their data to create a (weighted) con-
cordance table from C/IPC 4 digit codes to 4 digit SIC industries. This mapping can
be used to allocate patents to sectors of invention. To get the sector of use, we then
combine their mapping with the 1997 capital flow table from the BEA (the capital flow
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(b) Change in routine manual tasks and au-
tomation intensity
Figure 4: Scatter plots of routine tasks changes and automation intensity (auto 95) in 1980-
1998 in the United States. The list of sectors is given in Table A.24
stead of intermediate inputs). For each sector j and period τ , we compute autjτ as the
share of automation patents among machinery patents applied for during this period.
We consider 4 time periods: 1970-1980, 1980-1990 and 1990-1998 and the joint time
period 1980-1998. We restrict attention to sectors with at least 50 machinery patents
over the period. We can then measure automation intensity for 124 sectors in 1980-1998.
Our automation measure auto95 is only weakly correlated with computerization with a
coefficient of 0.17 (and −0.19 when we weigh industries by employment). See Appendix
A.4 for further details on the data.
Figure 4 provides simple scatter plots of the changes in routine tasks and the share
of automation patents in machinery over the years 1980-1998 (according to the auto95
definition). There is a clear relationship: sectors with a high share of automation patents
experience a larger decline in routine cognitive and routine manual tasks. Given our focus
on automation in machinery a decline in routine cognitive tasks might seem surprising at
first sight, but several machines replace workers in tasks such as inspection and control
(such an example is given in Figure A.2).
Table 3 reports the results of regressions (1) for the auto95 measure. Columns (3) and
(4) show that sectors with a high share of automation patents in machinery experienced
a large reduction in both cognitive and manual routine tasks in each decade (in the
90s, the coefficient on routine manual tasks is non significant). For instance, Panel B
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Table 3: Correlation between changes in task intensity or skill ratio across sectors and au-
tomation (auto95)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 1970 - 80, n=115
Share of automation -16.51 119.56** -81.66* -62.89 124.64***
patents in machinery (37.17) (50.18) (46.02) (43.35) (43.09)
D Computer use 6.38 10.17 -8.04 -7.33 -4.91
1984 - 1997 (4.98) (6.72) (6.16) (5.80) (5.77)
Intercept 0.90 -4.04 5.63** 5.64** -6.53**
(2.29) (3.10) (2.84) (2.67) (2.66)
R
2 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08
Weighted mean D 1.22 4.27 -0.25 0.89 -0.79
Panel B: 1980 - 90, n=115
Share of automation 88.81*** 82.67** -195.57*** -138.69*** 35.49
patents in machinery (29.21) (36.90) (29.78) (31.89) (29.50)
D Computer use 18.84*** 21.39*** -17.70*** -11.54* -1.86
1984 - 1997 (5.56) (7.02) (5.67) (6.07) (5.61)
Intercept -8.39*** -5.64 16.62*** 11.53*** -3.74
(2.71) (3.42) (2.76) (2.96) (2.73)
R
2 0.14 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.02
Weighted mean D 2.14 4.89 -2.01 -1.48 -1.33
Panel C: 1990 - 98, n=115
Share of automation 21.71 42.74 -77.53** -99.72** 40.21
patents in machinery (31.82) (36.19) (36.65) (38.65) (26.37)
D Computer use 12.97** 16.30*** -16.91*** -29.51*** 9.40**
1984 - 1997 (5.36) (6.10) (6.18) (6.51) (4.44)
Intercept -1.63 -2.31 5.90* 9.86*** -5.28**
(2.83) (3.22) (3.26) (3.43) (2.34)
R
2 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.05
Weighted mean D 2.54 4.10 -3.26 -3.43 -0.41
Standard errors are in parentheses. Colums (1) to (5) of Panels A to C each presents a separate OLS regression of
ten times the annual change in industry-level task input between the endpoints of the indicated time interval
(measured in centiles of the 1960 task distribution) on the share of automation patents in machinery (defined with the
95th percentile threshold) and the annual percentage point change in industry computer use during 1984 - 1997 as
well as a constant. In Column (6), the dependent variable is the ratio of high-skill (college graduates) to low-skill (high-
school graduates and dropouts) workers. Estimates are weighted by mean industry share of total employment in FTEs












indicates that a 1 pp increase in the share of automation patents is associated with
a 2 and 1.4 centiles decrease in routine cognitive and manual tasks in the 80s. The
standardized beta coefficients are larger than for computerization since they correspond
to 2.7 and 1.9 centiles in routine cognitive and manual tasks versus 1.3 and 0.8 though
the effect of computerization is larger in the 90s.13 We obtain similar results when we
restrict attention to biadic patents. In Appendix A.4, we also get similar results but with
a lower magnitude when we compute the share of automation patents with the auto90
measure. We also allocate patents to their sector of invention and include this measure
as a control in our regressions. We still find a negative effect of the use of automation
technologies on routine tasks.
Our classification of machinery patents as automation or non-automation is a pre-
requisite for our main empirical exercise where we focus on the effect of an increase in
labor costs on the innovations of equipment producers. Importantly, given a mapping
between C/IPC codes and sectors, it can also deliver a measure of automation at a more
detailed sectoral level than alternatives such as robotization. And we have now showed
that this measure is uncorrelated with computer use but is associated with a reduction
in routine tasks at the sectoral level.
3 A Simple Model
Before carrying out our empirical analysis, we present a simple model to clarify our
argument. The model is motivated by the business structure of the largest automation
innovators. In 2018, Siemens, the biggest innovator in our sample, had 31% of its work-
force in Germany but only 14% of its revenues from there. Its strongest growing division
was the Digital Factory Division which provides a broad range of automation technology
to manufacturers across the globe. The annual report describes how“The Digital Factory
Division offers a comprehensive product portfolio and system solutions for automation
technologies used in manufacturing industries, such as automation systems and software
for factory automation, industrial controls and numerical control systems, motors, drives
and inverters and integrated automation systems for machine tools and production ma-
chines...”. Note that this sentence includes a lot of our keywords. The report is centrally
interested in how “Changes in customer demand [for automation technology by down-
13The employment-weighted standard deviation in the share of automation patents in the 80s for the
included industry is 1.4% and the mean 7.8%, while the standard deviation for computerization is 0.07.
Meanwhile routine tasks decline by 2 and 1.5 centiles on average for these sectors.
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stream manufacturers] are strongly driven by macroeconomic cycles”. Interestingly, it
never mentions “cost of labor” as a reason for automation, but instead uses a number of
euphemisms such as “increase competitiveness”, “enhance efficiency”, “improve cost po-
sition” and “streamline production”. Siemens further discusses how such macroeconomic
trends affect its R&D decisions.
We incorporate these business features into a model built on Hémous and Olsen
(forthcoming). A manufacturing good is produced with a continuum of intermediate
inputs according to the Cobb-Douglas production function Y = exp
(∫ 1
0
ln y (i) di
)
,
where y(i) denotes the quantity of intermediate input i. The manufacturing good is the
numéraire. Each intermediate input is produced competitively with high-skill labor (h1,i









γ(i) is the productivity of low-skill workers, α(i) is an index which takes the value 0
for non-automated intermediates and 1 for automated intermediates and ν and β are
parameters in (0, 1). Machines are specific to the intermediate input i. If a machine
is invented, it is produced monopolistically, 1 for 1 with the final good so that the
monopolist charges a price px(i) ≥ 1. At the beginning of the period, for each non-
automated intermediate i, there is an innovator. The innovator creates a machine specific
to intermediate i with probability λ if she spends θλ2Y/2 units of manufacturing good.
For an automated intermediate input (α(i) = 1), the downstream producer is in-
different between using low-skill workers or machines together with high-skill work-
ers in production whenever wνHp
1−ν
x = wL/γ(i). Therefore, the machine producer is
in “Bertrand competition” with low-skill workers. As a machine costs 1, the machine





H , 1}, such that machines are
used if wL/γ(i) > w
ν
H . Since the manufacturing good is produced according to a Cobb-
Douglas production function, we get p(i)y(i) = Y for all intermediates. We can then










In turn, at the beginning of the period, the potential innovator solves maxλπAi −
θλ2Y/2, giving the equilibrium innovation rate λ=πAi /(θY ). As a result, the number of























This expression is increasing in the low-skill wage wL and decreasing in the high-skill
wage wH . Intuitively, the incentive to replace low-skill workers with machines (and high-
skill workers) increases with low-skill wages, leading to a higher demand for machines.
The reverse holds for high-skill wages. An upward shift in low-skill worker productivity,
γ(i), also reduces the number of automation innovations.
To contrast automation with other types of innovations, assume that the production








where mi denotes non-automation “Hicks” machines with quality qi. Hicks machines
are also produced one-for-one with the final good. Each period one innovator may
improve on the available quality of Hicks machines for intermediate i by a factor µ by
investing in R&D. If she spends θmλ
2
mY/2 units of the final good, she is successful with
probability λm. In that case, the innovator becomes the monopolistic provider of Hicks
machine i under the pressure of a competitive fringe which has access to the previous
technology, and the technology diffuses after one period. Otherwise, the good is produced
competitively. The previous analysis on automation innovations remains identical. A
successful Hicks innovator can charge a mark-up µ leading to profits πHi = (1− µ−1) δY.
The innovation rate is then λm = (1− µ−1) δ/θm, so that the number of Hicks innovations
is a constant given by NonAut = δ (1− µ−1) /θm. In contrast to automation innovations,
the number of non-automation innovations is independent of low- or high-skill wages.
4 Empirical Strategy and Data
We now take the predictions of our model to the data. In this section, we present
the regression framework and the data construction. Section 5 will discuss results and
identification assumptions.
4.1 Empirical strategy
As mentioned above, innovators in automation technologies are often large companies
(e.g. Siemens) which sell their automation equipment internationally. Following the
logic of our model, the incentives of the downstream producers to adopt automation
technology is determined by wages in their local market. As a result, the decision of
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innovators such as Siemens to pursue automation research in the first place depends on
the wages that their potential customers face in different countries.14 To link patents
with their owners, we use Orbis Intellectual Property.15
In our baseline regression, we assume that a firm’s innovation in automation is given




βwL lnwL,i,t−2 + βwH lnwH,i,t−2 + βXXi,t−2 + βKa lnKAut,i,t−2
+βKo lnKother,i,t−2 + βSa lnSPILLAut,i,t−2 + βSo lnSPILLother,i,t−2 + δi + δj,t
)
+ εi,t.
PATAut,i,t denotes the number of automation patents applied for by firm i in year t.
wL,i,t−2 and wH,i,t−2 denote the average low-skill and high-skill wages (more generally
labor costs) faced by the customers of firm i at time t − 2 (we explain below how we
proxy for them). Section 3 predicts that βwL > 0: an increase in the average low-
skill wage faced by the customers of firm i leads firm i to undertake more automation
innovations. It also predicts that βwH < 0 since high-skill workers are complements
to machines. Xi,t represents a vector of additional controls (average GDP per capita,
GDP gap and labor productivity). Labor productivity can capture technology or human
capital shocks in the country where machines may be sold, GDP per capita can capture
similar shocks but also demand shocks and the GDP gap business cycles fluctuations
and changes in demand.
Ideally, one may want to measure the cost of labor for automatable tasks or occu-
pations (as identified by Webb, 2000, for instance) instead of low-skill and high-skill
workers. Unfortunately, in the absence of good international occupational labor costs
data, we cannot pursue this approach. Insofar as low-skill and middle-skill workers are
those whose tasks have been more intensely automated, our low-skill wage measure can
be used as a proxy for the cost of automatable tasks. This proxy will be particularly good
14If the automation innovation is internal to the firm, then the argument follows if one interprets the
innovator’s customers as the different downstream production sites of the same firm.
15For companies in the same business group, R&D decisions could happen at the group level, though
treating a group as one agent is often too aggressive (for instance because subsidiaries might be in
different sectors). Therefore, for firms within the same business group, we normalize company names
by removing non-firm specific words such as country names or legal entity types and then merge firms
with the same normalized name. All other firms are treated as separate entities. Therefore, Siemens
S.A., Siemens Ltd. or Belgian Siemens S.A. are merged, but Primetals Technologies Germany Gmbh
which belongs to the same group remains a separate entity in our regressions.
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if labor markets are flexible across occupations within education groups or if the labor
shocks which move low-skill wages affect low-skill workers similarly across occupations.
Otherwise, our use of a noisy measure should result in downward bias.
Following ADHMV, we include controls for knowledge stocks at the firm and country
level. KAut,i,t−2 and Kother,i,t−2 denote the stocks of knowledge in automation and in other
technologies of firm i at time t − 2. These knowledge stocks are computed using the
perpetual inventory method.16 SPILLAut,i,t−2 and SPILLother,i,t−2 similarly denote the
stocks of external knowledge (spillovers) in automation and in other technologies which
firm i has access to at time t− 2 (we explain below how these are constructed). These
controls ensure that we are not simply capturing the fact that some firms or countries
are on different automation trends. δi are firm fixed effects. δj,t are industry-year fixed
effects (in some specifications we only have year fixed effects). The industry j of a firm is
the industry of manufacturing and corresponds to its 2 digit industry in Orbis. Appendix
Table A.2 gives the distribution of firms and patents across the main industries in our
sample. Finally, εi,t is an error term. The right-hand side variables are lagged by 2 years
in the baseline regressions to reflect the delay between changes in R&D investments and
patent applications—Section 5.6 considers alternative timing assumptions.17 We use the
ppmlhdfe command from Correia, Guimaraes and Zylkin (2020), which allows to run
Poisson regression models with high dimensional fixed effects.
4.2 Macroeconomic data
Our macroeconomic variables come primarily from the 2013 release of the World Input
Output Tables, henceforth, WIOD (Timmer et al. 2015). The database contains in-
formation on hourly labor costs across groups of educational attainment (low-, middle-
and high-skill workers) for the manufacturing sector from 1995 to 2009 for 40 coun-
tries including all major markets (US, Japan, all EU countries of 2009, China, India,
Brazil, Russia, etc.). We get similar data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office to
16We use ln(1 + K), a depreciation rate of 15% and a dummy for whether the knowledge stock is 0.
17To control for firm-level fixed effects, our baseline specification uses the Hausman, Hall and Griliches
(1984, HHG) method which is the count data equivalent to the within-group estimator. Technically,
this method is inconsistent with equation (3) as it requires strict exogeneity and hence prevents the
lagged dependent variable from appearing on the right-hand side (which it does through the knowledge
stock KAut,i,t−2). Yet, we show in Section 5.6, that our coefficients of interest are not affected by
Nickell’s bias by either removing the stock control or by implementing the Blundell, Griffith and Van
Reenen (1999) method, which uses the pre-sample average of the dependent variable to proxy for the
fixed effect, in line with the patent literature.
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add Switzerland, a large source of patents, to our analysis. For our baseline regressions,
we focus on labor costs in manufacturing but check that our results are robust to us-
ing labor costs in the entire economy. Although our measures cover all labor costs, we
refer to those as wages for simplicity. From the same dataset, we obtain measures of
labor productivity (as value added divided by hours) and producer price indices (PPI
for the whole economy and manufacturing). We obtain exchange rate and GDP data
from UNSTAT and compute the GDP gap to control for business cycles.18 All macroeco-
nomic variables are deflated in the same way. In the baseline regression, we first deflate
nominal values by the local PPI for manufacturing (indexed to 1995), and then convert
everything into dollars using the average exchange rate for 1995 the starting year of our
regressions. Appendix A.5 provides further details.
In the data, low-skill workers are defined as those without a high-school diploma
or equivalent and high-skill workers as those with at least a college degree. Middle-
and low-skill wages are very highly correlated so one should interpret our low-skill wage
variable as reflecting both.19
The countries with the highest low-skill wages (actually labor costs in manufacturing)
in 2009 are Belgium, Sweden and Finland with $41.9, $42.2 and $43.6 respectively (in
1995 dollars) and those with the lowest are India, Mexico and Bulgaria with $0.28,
$0.61 and $0.71, respectively. The corresponding number for the US is $13.7. Table 4
summarizes these values and further shows that the ratio of high-skill to low-skill wages
varies considerably across countries, even among those that have relatively similar low-
skill wages. The skill-premium in the United States rose from 2.46 to 3.02 during this
period while it slightly declined in Belgium from 1.56 to 1.46.
4.3 Computing firm’s market-specific wages and spillovers
Ideally, we would like to measure the wages paid by the (actual and potential) customers
of automation innovators. Since we do not observe them, we build a proxy which is a
weighted average of country-level wages where the weights reflect the market exposure
of innovators. We define the average low-skill wage faced by a firm’s customers wL,i,t as
18We use a HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 on ln(GDP ) to get the trend, and the GDP
gap is measured as the difference between ln(GDP ) and its trend.
19For our baseline sample of firms, included in Table 6 below, the correlation between low-skill and
middle-skill wages is 0.94 controlling for firm and industry-year fixed effects versus 0.6 for low-skill and
high-skill wages. See Appendix Table A.3.
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1995 2009 1995 2009 1995 2009
India 0.19 0.28 0.89 1.38 4.79 4.98
Mexico 0.89 0.61 3.46 2.56 3.90 4.21
Bulgaria 1.29 0.71 4.27 1.60 3.32 2.25
United States 11.57 13.67 28.42 41.23 2.46 3.02
Belgium 29.50 41.89 45.98 61.24 1.56 1.46
Sweden 19.92 42.16 34.44 55.92 1.73 1.33
Finland 23.41 43.63 28.10 63.71 1.20 1.46
Note: Wages data, taken from WIOD. The table shows manufacturing low-skill and high-skill
wages (technically labor costs) deflated by (manufacturing) PPI and converted to USD using av-
erage 1995 exchange rates. Skill-premium is the ratio of high-skill to low-skill wages. The table







where wL,c,t is the low-skill wage in country c at time t and ωi,c is the fixed weight of
country c for firm i. We use the same approach to compute average high-skill wages,
productivity or GDP per capita. Firms have different exposure to different markets
because of trade barriers, heterogeneous tastes of customers, or various historical ac-
cidents if exporting involves sunk costs. This is a shift-share measure. The weights
are computed pre-sample to ensure that they are weakly exogenous as patent location
could be influenced by innovation shocks. Since the weights are fixed, our identification
relies on how country-level shocks affect firms differently. In fact, had we observed the
wages of the customers of automation innovators, those would have suffered from reverse
causality, and we would have used our measure as an instrument. Our regression should
therefore be viewed as the reduced form of this instrumental approach. We discuss the
recent literature on shift-share regressions in detail in Section 5.5.20
To measure the weights in the absence of sales data, we follow and expand on the
methodology of Aghion et al. (2016, ADHMV). We use the firm’s pre-sample history of
patent filing as a proxy for its market exposure. A patent grants its holder the exclusive
right to commercially exploit a technology in a specific country for a limited period of
time and inventors must file a patent in each country where they wish to protect their
20As we keep the weights fixed we look at how wage changes in the countries where a firm already
sells affect the firm’s automation innovation. A different question would have been to analyze how wage
changes affect a firm’s decision to enter a new market. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
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technology. Patenting is costly: a firm needs to hire lawyers and possibly translators as
well as pay the filing costs. Further, the publication of a patent can increase vulnerability
to imitation and inventors are therefore unlikely to apply for patent protection in a
country unless they are relatively certain of the potential market value for the technology
(Eaton and Kortum, 1996). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that inventors do not
patent widely and indiscriminately, with the average invention only patented in two
countries (see Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011).
We compute for each firm the fraction of its patents in machinery protected in each
country c for which we have wage data, ω̃i,c, during the pre-sample period 1970-1994.
We restrict attention to patent families with at least one citation (not counting self-
citations) to exclude the lowest quality patents. See Appendix A.6 for details notably
on EPO patents. Patenting indicates whether the firm intends to sell in that market.
However, a patent in Belgium and one in the U.S. are unlikely to reflect the same market
size. At the same time, a larger market attracts more firms so that the market size per
firm will generally not grow 1 for 1 with country size. To account for this we weigh each
market c by GDP 0.350,c , where GDP0,c is the 5 year average GDP of country c at the end








We use alternative weighting schemes in Section 5.6.
ADHMV verify that a similar method accounts well for the sales distribution of
major auto manufacturers. Coelli, Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2020) carry out a more
systematic exercise and verify such a method accounts well for aggregate bilateral trade
flows and firm exports across 8 country groups in a representative panel of 15,000 firms
from 7 European countries (regressing patent weights on sales weights gives a coefficient
of 0.89 with a s.e. of 0.008). In supplemental material available on our web page, we
also show that our patent weights correlate well with trade flows.
Given that knowledge spillovers have a geographical component, we use the location
of firms’ innovators to build a measure of the stock of knowledge to which a firm is
exposed. We follow ADHMV and compute the stocks of automation patents and of
21Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) estimate the elasticity of French exports to GDP of the desti-
nation country to be 1 and the elasticity of the number of French exporters to be 0.65. This gives an
elasticity of the average export by firm of 0.35. ADHMV use a power of 1 on GDP instead of 0.35.
23
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for firms in our baseline regression
Variable Auto95 Auto90 Auto95 Auto90
Automation pantents per year 1997-2011 per year 1997-2011 Weights
Mean 0.78 11.65 0.92 13.79 Largest country 0.47 0.46
Standard deviation 3.97 52.60 4.71 62.55 Second largest 0.17 0.18
p50 0 2 0 2 US 0.21 0.21
p75 0 6 0 7 Japan 0.17 0.15
p90 1 19 2 22 Germany 0.2 0.21
p95 3 42 4 49 France 0.08 0.09
p99 13 184 15 216 UK 0.09 0.09
Number of firms 3341 4903
Note: Summary statistics for the firms used in our baseline regression.
1
other patents in each country. Then, for each firm, we build a weighted average of
country-level knowledge stocks, where the weights correspond to the location of their
innovators pre-sample in 1970-1994.22
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Our basic dataset consists of applicants who have applied to at least one biadic au-
tomation patent between 1997 and 2011, who have at least one patent prior to 1995
which can be used to compute weights, and who are not fully domestic (we exclude
firms which have only patented in one country pre-sample). For the auto95 measure
this corresponds to 3, 341 firms, which are responsible for 35, 803 or 58% of the total
number of biadic auto95 innovations. Table 5 gives some descriptive statistics on the
number of automation patents per year and the country weights for the firms in our
sample. Over the period 1997-2011, the median firm in the sample filed 2 auto95 and
auto90 patent applications. The distribution is very skewed and the 99th percentile firm
in the sample has filed 184 auto95 patents. The largest country for a given firm has on
average a weight of 0.47 (for auto95). To ensure that our results are not driven solely by
the largest country, which we refer to as the “home country” of a firm, we will include
in some regressions home country-year fixed effects. The second largest country has on
average a weight of 0.17. The three countries with the largest weights on average are
the United States, Germany and Japan. Appendix Table A.4 gives the list of the ten
biggest automation patenters in our sample.
22The country stocks are built using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 15%.
We add dummy variables indicating when the spillover stocks are zero.
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5 Global Wages and Induced Automation
We present our main results in three steps: First, our baseline regressions use the full
variation of firm low-skill wages to estimate the effect of an increase in low-skill wages
on automation innovations. Second, we use country-year fixed effects to isolate the
contribution of foreign wages. Third, we contrast the results on automation innovations
with those on other types of machinery innovations. The rest of the section discusses
identification assumptions, contains robustness checks and additional results including
on the minimum wage.
5.1 Baseline results
Table 6 contains our baseline results. The dependent variable is the number of automa-
tion (auto95) biadic patents. We use the years 1997-2011 for the dependent variable
and, due to the lag structure, 1995-2009 for the independent variables. Recall that skill-
dependent wages are measured in the manufacturing sector and deflated by the PPI in
that sector.
Table 6: Baseline regressions: effect of wages on automation innovations (auto95)
Dependent variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.21∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 3.59∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.73) (0.74) (0.75) (0.81) (0.84) (0.78) (0.84) (0.94)
High-skill wage -0.92 -0.88 -1.56∗∗ -1.73∗∗ -1.43∗∗ -2.22∗∗∗ -2.61∗∗∗ -1.52∗
(0.71) (0.67) (0.64) (0.72) (0.71) (0.72) (0.79) (0.80)
Stock automation -0.13∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Stock other 0.63∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
GDP gap -3.30 -3.50 -3.00 -4.30∗ -4.82∗ -2.69
(2.52) (2.59) (2.65) (2.57) (2.66) (2.74)
Labor productivity 0.40 0.91
(0.92) (0.92)
GDP per capita -0.31 -1.94
(1.14) (1.29)
Spillovers automation 0.60∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.76∗∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
Spillovers other -0.27 -0.32 -0.41∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
Fixed effects F+Y F+Y F+Y F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY
Observations 50115 50115 50115 49174 49174 49174 49174 49174 49174
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3329 3329 3329 3329 3329 3329
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Esti-
mation is done by conditional Poisson fixed effects regressions (HHG). All regressions include firm and year or year-
industry fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables (resp. spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock
(resp. no spillover). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Column (1) shows the results with only firm and year fixed effects. A higher low-skill
manufacturing wage for the customers of an innovating firm predicts more automation
innovation. The estimated coefficient is an elasticity so that an increase of 1% in the
low-skill wage is associated with 2.2% more automation patents. Column (2) introduces
high-skill wages as a control. In all specifications, high-skill wages have a negative
(though not always significant) coefficient. Column (3) adds controls for the firm’s
stock of knowledge: a higher stock of automation knowledge predicts less automation
innovations. Column (4) adds industry-year fixed effects and controls for the GDP gap.
Columns (5) and (6) add controls for labor productivity in manufacturing and GDP
per capita. None of these macroeconomic controls have consistent significant effects.
Columns (7) to (9) repeat columns (4) to (6) but include knowledge spillovers and find
that firms which are exposed to more knowledge in automation technologies innovate
more in automation. In all specifications, the coefficient on low-skill wages is highly
significant with elasticities between 1.8 and 2.9 for columns (1) to (8) and a larger
elasticity of 3.6 in column (9). From column (4) onwards, we also control for industry-
year fixed effects (where the industry is that of the innovating firm).
In the baseline specification, we cluster at the firm-level to account for auto-correlation
in errors. As firms in the same country might be affected by common shocks, we clus-
ter standard errors at the home country (i.e. the country of largest weight) level in
Appendix Table A.5. If anything, this tends to reduce the standard error on low-skill
wages, a pattern that repeats itself throughout the specifications.23
5.2 Country-year Fixed Effects and Foreign wages
Country-level shocks which we have not controlled for may impact both wages and
innovation, by affecting the cost of innovation or the demand for automation machines
through other channels than wages. A tax reform in Germany, for instance, could
affect both German low-skill wages and the incentive to innovate. Shocks that mainly
affect firms through their home country can be captured through home country-year
fixed effects in which case our estimation procedure relies on variation in foreign wages.
23A potential explanation for the negatively correlated error terms, is that a successful innovation
by one firm reduces the innovation of its competitors as the market is already captured. In addition,
standard errors may overstate confidence levels if the number of clusters is small or the size distribution
of clusters is skewed. To address this, Appendix Table A.5 also includes p-values for low-skill wages
using the BDM bootstrap-t approach of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). All coefficients remain
strongly significant.
26
Table 7: Country-year fixed effects
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low-skill wage 2.21∗∗ 2.55∗∗ 3.56∗∗∗ 4.14∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 4.14∗∗
(0.99) (1.13) (1.24) (1.31) (1.54) (1.77)
High-skill wage -2.89∗∗∗ -2.16∗∗ -1.98∗ -4.29∗∗∗ -2.95∗∗ -4.29∗∗∗
(0.94) (1.05) (1.05) (1.29) (1.46) (1.39)
GDP gap 4.01 4.94 6.31 -0.72 1.29 -0.73
(6.85) (6.89) (7.16) (4.49) (4.84) (5.12)
Stock automation -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Stock other 0.66∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Spillovers automation 1.39∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47)
Spillovers other -1.07∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Labor productivity -1.68 -2.15
(1.76) (1.58)
GDP per capita -3.33∗ 0.00
(1.88) (2.07)
Fixed effects F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773
Firms 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two peri-
ods. Estimation is done by conditional Poisson fixed effects regressions (HHG). All regressions include firm,
industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. Columns (4) to (6) use normalized foreign macroeconomic
variables. Normalized foreign low-skill wages are defined as the log of foreign low-skill wages interacted with
a measure of the importance of foreign markets in the total wage. This measure is computed at the begin-
ning of the sample period and equals the foreign weight times the foreign low-skill wage divided by total
low-skill wages. Normalized foreign high-skill wages, labor productivity and GDP per capita are defined
similarly. Normalized foreign GDP gap is the foreign GDP gap interacted with the foreign weight. See text
for details. All regressions include dummies for no stock and no spillover. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1Moreover country-year fixed effects are useful to address reverse causality: a technology
shock that leads German firms to introduce more automation innovations and therefore
lower German wages is unlikely to affect non-German wages since each firm is small for
foreign countries. Our identification assumption is then that foreign wages are exogenous
to the automation innovation of the firm given our set of controls. We discuss a number
of potential confounding factors below.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 7 reproduce Columns (7) to (9) of Table 6 but add
country-year fixed effects, where the country of a firm is still defined as the country
with the largest weight (using the headquarters’ location to define the home country
gives similar results). We still obtain a positive effect of low-skill wages on automation
innovations with similar elasticities (between 2.2 and 3.6).
Columns (4) to (6) go further and only consider the foreign component of wages (and
of the other macroeconomic variables). To do so, we decompose total low-skill wages
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wL,i,t into their home and foreign components as wL,i,t = ωi,DwL,D,t+ωi,FwL,F,t where ωi,D
is the home weight, wL,D,t the home wage, ωi,F = 1− ωi,D the foreign weight and wL,F,t







captures the fact that more internationally
exposed firms are more affected by foreign wages and is computed at the beginning of
the sample – though we obtain similar results when we use the average value over the
whole sample. This specification ensures that our coefficient can be interpreted as an







an increase in the normalized low-skill wage by 0.01 corresponds to an increase in total
wages by 1% (recall that we have firm fixed effects). Normalized foreign high-skill wages,
GDP per capita and labor productivity are defined similarly (as GDP gap is already an
average of logs, we directly interact the foreign variables with ωi,F ). Once again we
find a positive effect of low-skill wages on automation innovation, with somewhat larger
elasticities between 4.1 and 5.1. High-skill wages are the only other macro variable with
a consistently significant effect, which is negative between −2 and −4.3. No other paper
using the ADHMV methodology controls for country-year fixed effects and separates
foreign wages.
Appendix Table A.6 reproduces the regressions of columns (7) to (9) in Table 6
and of Table 7 but for the auto90 measure of automation. The results are very similar
but the coefficients on low-skill wages tend to be of a smaller magnitude, in line with
auto95 being a stricter measure of automation. This also helps explain the magnitude
of our elasticities in the previous tables: our analysis focuses on innovations with a high
automation content (and therefore most likely to respond to an increase in wages) and
one should not take our estimates directly to measure the average macro response of the
economy to an increase in wages.
Skill-premium. In the previous regressions, the coefficients on low-skill and high-
skill wages are of a similar magnitude but opposite signs suggesting that a driver of
automation innovations is the skill premium. Table 8 directly regresses automation
innovation on the log of the inverse of the skill premium. The coefficient on the inverse
skill premium is always of the same magnitude as that on low-skill wages in previous
specifications and highly significant. To illustrate the magnitude of our coefficients and
the effect of spillovers and stock variables, we run a simulation in Appendix A.7 where we
uniformly and permanently decrease the global skill-premium by 10%. This increases
the average share of automation innovations in machinery by 4.8 p.p. over the time
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Table 8: Skill premium
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill / High-skill wages 2.49∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.65∗∗∗ 4.25∗∗∗ 4.11∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.69) (0.68) (0.87) (0.86) (0.87) (1.25) (1.22) (1.24)
GDP gap -4.59∗ -4.86∗ -4.57∗ 4.24 4.67 5.02 -0.76 -0.25 -0.57
(2.55) (2.57) (2.57) (6.77) (6.71) (6.83) (4.50) (4.56) (4.60)
Labor productivity 0.96 -1.28 -0.43
(0.64) (1.09) (0.72)
GDP per capita -0.04 -1.71 -0.14
(0.72) (1.11) (0.88)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 49174 49174 49174 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773
Firms 3329 3329 3329 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by con-
ditional Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and industry-year fixed effects. Columns (4)-(9) include firm,
industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. Columns (7)-(9) compute the normalized foreign (log) inverse skill premium as the difference
between the normalized (log) foreign low-skill wages and the normalized (log) foreign high-skill wages previously defined. In these columns,
GDP gap, GDP per capita and labor productivity also correspond to their normalized foreign values. All regressions include dummies for no
stock and no spillovers. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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period, with 2.7 p.p. coming from the adjustment of stocks and spillovers.
5.3 Non-automation innovations
Is the effect of wages on automation innovations specific to automation or does it affect
machinery patents in general? To answer this question, we now look at “placebo” re-
gressions. Specifically, we consider the set of machinery patents and exclude any patent
which has a technology category with a prevalence measure above the 60th percentile of
the distribution of C/IPC 6-digit codes in the machinery (0.2091). We refer to these
as “placebo machinery” innovations. We recompute knowledge stocks and spillover vari-
ables for these innovations (“own”) and for all innovations except those (“other”). Table
9 reports the results. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to the baseline regressions with
firm and industry-year fixed effects. Low-skill wages only have a positive and significant
effect in column (3), but even in that case the coefficient is statistically significantly
smaller than with automation (and loses significance with other deflators). Columns (4)
to (6) repeat the same regressions but add country-year fixed effects and columns (7) to
(9) focus on foreign wages. Neither low-skill wages nor any other macroeconomic control
variable has an effect on placebo machinery innovations. The sign of low-skill wages
even flip in columns (7) to (9).24 We view this exercise as validating both our empirical
24Conditioning on the 60th percentile is not important and we obtain similar results with machinery
innovations excluding auto95 or auto90. Further, replacing low-skill and high-skill wages with the skill
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Table 9: Non-automation innovations
Dependent variable Placebo Machinery
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 0.51 0.68 1.73∗∗ -0.07 -0.03 0.77 -0.64 -1.22 -0.80
(0.60) (0.69) (0.69) (0.80) (0.91) (0.95) (1.19) (1.29) (1.23)
High-skill wage -0.18 0.12 0.79 -0.27 -0.19 0.20 0.33 -0.39 0.24
(0.71) (0.65) (0.75) (0.97) (0.91) (1.02) (1.18) (1.30) (1.33)
GDP gap -3.39∗∗ -3.04∗ -0.07 -1.15 -1.06 0.31 -2.72 -3.87 -3.02
(1.51) (1.59) (1.90) (3.61) (3.64) (3.67) (2.62) (2.78) (2.76)
Stock own 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Stock other 0.55∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Spillovers own 2.63∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.41) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Spillovers other -2.31∗∗∗ -2.32∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗ -1.32∗∗ -1.26∗∗ -1.33∗∗ -1.28∗∗ -1.33∗∗
(0.46) (0.46) (0.49) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53)
Labor productivity -0.66 -0.17 1.18
(0.72) (1.10) (1.14)
GDP per capita -3.08∗∗∗ -1.85 0.27
(0.99) (1.35) (1.35)
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 114724 114724 114724 114478 114478 114478 114478 114478 114478
Firms 7696 7696 7696 7693 7693 7693 7693 7693 7693
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by
conditional Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and industry-year fixed effects, while (4)-(9) include
firm, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. In Columns (7)–(9) the macroeconomic variables are the normalized foreign variables
previously defined. Stock and spillover variables are calculated with respect to the dependent variable (placebo machinery). Standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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approach and our measure of automation.
5.4 Threats to identification
The previous results establish a correlation between the development of automation tech-
nology by a firm and the wages faced by its customers. This relationships is persistent
and stable to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Adding country-year fixed
effects controls for unobservable shocks to the home country and make it unlikely that
reverse causality is the driver. Ideally, we are interested in the effect of an increase in
wages on the firm’s propensity to introduce automation innovation (in the spirit of our
model, we would like to identify ∂λ/∂wL). Of course, wages are an equilibrium outcome,
but what matters for identification is that they are exogenous to the inventor. Labor
market shocks in manufacturing, such as changes to labor supply or labor costs from
regulation, demand for labor in other sectors or demographics, present ideal variation
from this perspective. In Section 6, we will therefore focus on a specific labor-market
premium in these regressions gives insignificant coefficients. (Results not shown).
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shock namely the Hartz reforms in Germany. Consequently, threats to identification
arise from other foreign shocks which are correlated with wages and other drivers of
automation. We now look at these in detail.
Foreign demand shocks in manufacturing. The biggest threat to identification
comes from foreign demand shocks in manufacturing which might drive both wages and
the demand for automation equipment. Some aspects of this have already been captured
by the controls in Table 7 (GDP gap, GDP per capita and labor productivity). We look
at additional controls in Table 10. i) Columns (1) and (5) further control for the share of
the manufacturing sector built in the same manner as wages in regressions with country-
year fixed effects and either total wages or only foreign wages. The manufacturing share
has no consistent effect by itself and does not alter the other coefficients significantly. ii)
Conversely, increased offshoring in the foreign country might reduce both wages and the
willingness to buy automation technology. We construct a measure of offshoring at the
country-level based on the methodology of Timmer et al. (2014): the share of foreign
value added in the gross value added in manufacturing. Then, as for other variables, we
build a firm-specific value by taking a weighted average. As can be seen from Columns
(2) and (6), this does not materially alter the coefficients. iii) In addition, the real
interest rate covaries with the business cycle and is a potential important determinant
of the cost of purchasing equipment. Columns (3) and (7) show that including the real
yield on 10-year government bonds does not alter the coefficients much.25
Labor productivity shocks. We already control for overall labor productivity. An
additional concern might come from low-skill specific labor productivity shocks such as
γ(i) in Section 3, but a positive shock to γ(i) would be associated with higher wages and
less automation innovation and would correspondingly bias our estimates downwards.
Innovation shocks. A recent period of higher than usual automation innovation
might leave both wages and the incentive for further innovation low, creating a spurious
positive correlation. To address this, we construct a measure of recent innovation in the
same manner as we do for the low-skill wages: for each country we compute the number of
automation innovations (from our set of firms or others) applied for in the last three years
and then build firm-specific measures. We build a similar control for other innovations.
The results in Columns (4) and (8) of Table 10 show that our results carry through (the
low-skill wage coefficient in column (4) is just at the margin of significance).
Shocks to the inventing firm. Labor costs also affect the inventing firms through
25We get data for 21 countries (AT AU BE CA CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT JP KR LU NL
PT SE US) from the IMF and the OECD and deflate nominal yields using the manufacturing PPI.
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Table 10: Additional controls
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low-skill wage 2.84∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗ 2.01 4.58∗∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗ 5.06∗∗∗ 7.04∗∗∗
(1.41) (1.15) (1.14) (1.24) (1.75) (1.50) (1.53) (1.72)
High-skill wage -1.90 -1.46 -1.98∗ -1.26 -3.24∗∗ -3.02∗∗ -2.79∗ -3.97∗∗∗
(1.18) (0.99) (1.04) (0.99) (1.48) (1.45) (1.44) (1.46)
GDP gap 4.30 5.04 5.83 7.02 2.88 1.99 2.07 3.21
(6.78) (6.87) (6.98) (6.78) (5.32) (5.27) (4.82) (4.93)
Labor productivity -2.19 -2.69 -1.56 -2.45 -1.99 -1.71 -2.37 -5.14∗∗
(2.21) (1.67) (1.78) (1.85) (1.63) (1.54) (1.58) (2.09)




Long-term interest rate 0.09 -0.03
(0.11) (0.06)
Recent innovation own -2.77∗∗ 1.24
(1.27) (0.92)
Recent innovation other 1.79∗∗ -0.34
(0.77) (0.79)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 48773 48773 48467 48773 48773 48773 48356 48773
Firms 3324 3324 3299 3324 3324 3324 3294 3324
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by
conditional Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG). All columns include firm, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. “Recent in-
novation own” denotes the log of a weighted average of automation innovations in the customer’s countries in the last 3 years and “recent
innovation other” the same value for all other innovations in these countries. In Columns (4) and (8), wages, GDP gap, labor productiv-
ity, and the long-term interest rate are recomputed using weights for the limited set of countries for which interest rates are available (see
text). In columns (5)-(8) wages, GDP gap, and labor productivity correspond to their normalized foreign values as previously defined.
Normalized foreign recent innovation is defined like the normalized foreign low-skill wages as the interaction between the foreign value
and a measure of the importance of foreign markets in the total variable. This measure is computed at the beginning of the sample period
and equals the foreign weight times the foreign recent innovation divided by total recent innovation. Normalized foreign manufacturing
share, offshoring and long-term interest rates are defined similarly to the normalized foreign GDP gap as the interaction between their
foreign component and the foreign weight. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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its production and R&D costs. Country-year fixed effects alleviate this concern as long
as production and R&D are concentrated in the home country. For production costs,
if a firm serves a foreign market through offshoring instead of exporting, higher foreign
low-skill wages in production would increase the price of machines and therefore bias
our coefficient on low-skill wages toward 0. For R&D costs, we can address the potential
issue by re-building our firm-specific macro variable using weights based on the location
of inventors instead of patent offices. Appendix Table A.7 shows that the coefficient on
the baseline low-skill wages remains positive and significant but the coefficient on low-
skill wages weighted by inventor weights is small and insignificant. These regressions
provide an additional placebo test as they treat firms with the same macroeconomic
shocks but weigh them differently.
Placebo. Throughout, our coefficient on low-skill wages should be compared to that
from regressions with the placebo machinery innovations, which show persistently little
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effect from low-skill wages on innovation. Therefore, if our result on the effect of low-
skill wages on automation innovations came from a bias, then that bias would have to
be absent for other types of machinery innovations.
5.5 Shift Share
A recent literature addresses the identifying assumptions behind the shift-share set-up
in linear regressions. In this respect, it is important for our identification strategy that
the weights are pre-determined; that is firms do not choose where to patent based on
their expectation of future wages. Appendix Table A.8 demonstrates that country-level
growth rates in low- and high-skill wages between 1995 and 2000 have no predictive power
on firm weights in 1995. Appendix Table A.9 shows that our results are robust to using
weights computed only up to 1989 or to dropping the first 5 years of the regression.26
We interpret our results through the lens of Borusyak, Hull and Jaravel (2018) who
show, in the language of our setting, that the random assignment of wage shocks condi-
tional on weights can be sufficient for identification. The inference is valid if either there
is a large number of countries (such that the Herfindahl index tends toward 0) affected
by independent shocks (controlling for year and firm fixed effects); or the correlation of
shocks within a country decays sufficiently rapidly that a large number of country-years
is sufficient (see Appendix A2 in their paper).27 They advise practitioners to use ap-
propriate controls to capture omitted variables. We follow this approach by including a
large set of controls and country-year fixed effects in our regressions. They recommend
applying the standard error correction of Adão, Kolesár and Morales (2019).28
Adão et. al. (2019) show that applications with the shift-share design often lead to
an over-rejection of the null. In the language of our application, the problem arises when
the residual errors of firms with similar country-distributions are correlated and is not
solved by standard clustering. They derive a formula for correcting standard errors in
an OLS, which we cannot use directly since we employ a Poisson estimator. Deriving
26Appendix Table A.9 also shows that the results are robust to dropping the earlier years from
the weights. It looks at alternatives to premultiplying our patents weights with GDP 0.35c : with no
multiplication, multiplying by GDP or by total payment to low-skill workers raised to the power of
0.35,(wLL)
0.35
, which may be a better measure of the potential market for technology designed to
automate low-skill work. The results are very similar.
27The Herfindahl index is 0.13 and 0.09 when only foreign weights are included. At the country-year
level, the corresponding values are 0.009 and 0.006.
28Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorking and Swift (2020) show that the shift-share setup is valid if the weights
are exogenous. In our context, this would require that no unobserved shock–even one uncorrelated with
low-skill wages–can affect automation through the weights, which would be a strong assumption.
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Table 11: Monte-Carlo simulations
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.90 2.67∗ 3.59∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗ 4.14∗∗ 5.08∗∗ 4.14∗∗∗
[0.105] [0.072] [0.015] [0.006] [0.003] [0.019] [0.018] [0.023] [0.000]
High-skill wage -2.22∗∗ -2.61 -1.52 -2.89∗∗∗ -2.16∗ -1.98∗∗ -4.29∗ -2.95∗∗ -4.29
[0.046] [0.125] [0.156] [0.005] [0.065] [0.010] [0.062] [0.029] [0.205]
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP gap Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor productivity Yes Yes Yes
GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 49174 49174 49174 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773
Firms 3329 3329 3329 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324
Note: Marginal effects; P-values in brackets. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and industry-year fixed effects. Columns (4)-(9) add country-
year fixed effects. Columns (7)-(9) use the normalized foreign macro variables previously defined. All regressions include controls for
stocks and spillovers. P-values are computed by sampling with replacement the entire path of macroeconomic variables for each firm
with 1000 draws. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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the corresponding correction for the Poisson estimator is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead we implement a Monte Carlo simulation similar to what they do and show that
we do not have the same problem of over-rejection.
Specifically, we replicate the regressions of Columns (7) to (9) in Table 6 and of
Table 7. For each firm we keep the automation activity, the stocks of innovations,
the spillover variables, as well as the distribution of country-weights based on actual
data. For each country, we sample with replacement the entire path of macroeconomics
variables (wages, labor productivity, GDP per capita and GDP gap) from the existing set
with 1000 draws. Table 11 reports the p-values of the coefficients on low-skill wages and
high-skill wages based on the simulated distribution of coefficients. The p-values are not
markedly different than the ones obtained assuming the standard normal distribution.
In particular, the coefficients of interest on low-skill wages are significant at least at the
10% level (except in column 1 with a p-value of 0.105) and at the 2.5% level when we
focus on foreign wages. In the language of Adão et al. (2019) the set of controls soaks
up most country-specific shocks affecting the outcome variable and, consequently, no
shift-share structure is left in the regression residuals.
Finally, Appendix Table A.10 checks that our results are not driven by a single
country by sequentially excluding countries in our preferred set-up (with foreign wages
and controlling for labor productivity). Excluding a country means that we treat it like
the home country when computing normalized foreign wages. We also include the weight
of the excluded country times a year dummy as a control. We successively remove the six
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largest countries by average weight (US, JP, DE, GB, FR, IT and ES). The coefficient
on low-skill wages always remains negative and significant.29
5.6 Additional Robustness Checks and Results
Timing. We look at alternative lags for the dependent variables in Appendix Table
A.11 (we keep a lag of 2 for the stock variables, otherwise the dependent variable would
be included in the RHS in the lead and contemporaneous cases). The largest coefficient
on low-skill wages is obtained for a 2 year lag. It remains relatively stable without
country-year fixed effects, while it is more clearly centered around lag 2 with country-
year fixed effects.30 Of course, innovators would not be interested in wages 2 years in
the past per se, but only inasmuch as they are indicative of future wages. This is our
interpretation throughout of our regressions, with the 2 year lag corresponding roughly
to the time spent between an effect on R&D and the first results materialized by a patent
application. In Appendix Table A.13, we compute predicted future wages at time t− 2
based on an AR(1) process with country-specific trends and find similar results.
Innovation types. We look at other definitions or subcategories of automation
innovations in Table 12 which reproduces regressions similar to Column (5) of Table 7
with foreign wages and controlling for labor productivity. Column (1) verifies that the
results are not driven by the codes that we added to the definition of the machinery
technological field listed in footnote 8 (though, we still exclude the weapons categories).
Column (2) presents a laxer definition of automation using the 80th percentile of the
distribution of the C/IPC 6 digit codes. The effect of low-skill wages is still positive
but smaller than for auto90 or auto95. Columns (3) and (4) show that the results are
similar for Automat*90 and Automat*80 patents. Automat*90 patents are those which
belong to technological categories with a frequency of only the “automat*” group of
keywords above the threshold used to define auto90 and automat*80, robot90 or CNC90
are defined analogously. By definition automat*80 patents are all auto80 but 91.5% of
29Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorking and Swift (2020) advise carrying out a similar exercise by excluding
countries with a large Rotemberg weight. Yet, this requires computing our macrovariables as weighted
averages of log country-level variables instead of log of weighted averages of country-level variables. We
checked that the six countries with the largest Rotemberg weights are the UK, FR, SE, DE, US and
BE. Our results are also robust to excluding Belgium and Sweden.
30Appendix Table A.12 carries out placebo regressions where we regress automation innovation on
5, 10 or 15 year leads of wages. We do not find a significant effect of leading low-skill wages (except a
negative effect in one column). As expected, given the large number of coefficients a few of the other
coefficients are significant but never in a systematic way across specifications.
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Table 12: Innovation categories
Dependent variable AutoX95 Auto80 Automat*90 Automat*80 Robot90 Robot80 CNC90 CNC80
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign:
Low-skill wage 5.22∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗ 6.90∗∗∗ 5.53∗∗∗ 5.83∗ 7.09∗∗∗ -1.71 -1.15
(1.59) (1.29) (2.13) (1.94) (3.23) (2.49) (4.01) (3.10)
High-skill wage -1.57 -1.82 -2.05 -1.96 -0.09 -3.27 5.02 0.89
(1.60) (1.33) (1.92) (1.77) (2.91) (2.32) (5.40) (3.59)
GDP gap -0.07 1.01 7.76 3.90 4.83 0.21 -1.11 -0.03
(4.50) (3.03) (5.08) (4.64) (8.19) (6.77) (11.20) (9.34)
Labor productivity -3.51∗∗ -1.09 -5.16∗∗∗ -4.12∗∗ -6.71∗∗ -5.10∗∗ -3.20 -0.60
(1.69) (1.22) (1.87) (1.73) (2.73) (2.21) (4.85) (3.15)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 46980 96695 32738 48950 15927 23060 7609 13417
Firms 3224 6494 2264 3331 1156 1619 582 987
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry-year and country-year fixed effects. AutoX95
excludes the C/IPC codes which we added when defining the machinery technological field. Auto80 lowers the threshold to define au-
tomation innovation to the 80th percentile of the C/IPC 6 digit distribution. Automat*90 and Automat*80 only count words associated
with automat. Robot90 and Robot80 only count words associated with robot. CNC90 and CNC80 words associated with CNC. 90 and
80 refer to the threshold used to delimit patents which is the 90th or the 80th percentile of the distribution of automation keywords for
6 digit C/IPC codes. The macroeconomic variables are the normalized foreign variables previously defined. Stocks and spillovers are
computed with respect to the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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them are also auto90. Column (5) and (6) shows that our results extend to robot90
and robot80 patents (which are also all auto95). The results differ for CNC patents in
columns (7) and (8) perhaps because the sample size is much smaller.
Minimum wage. Given its policy relevance, we also look at the effect of minimum
wages using data on 22 countries in regressions where we replace low-skill wages with
the minimum wage in Appendix Table A.14.31 We find a positive effect of the minimum
wage on automation innovations but the coefficients tend to be smaller in the foreign
wage regressions and in one specification the coefficient is insignificant. Therefore low-
skill wages are a better predictor of automation than the minimum wage. This is not
surprising: first, the minimum wage only captures part of the labor costs, second we
focus on automation innovations that often happen in manufacturing where low-skill
wages tend to be substantially above it, and third we lose nearly half of our countries.
An analysis on automation in service industries might show a stronger relationship.
Long-difference. For most of our regressions, we follow the large patent literature
and rely on the Poisson estimator, which best handles the count data nature of our
dependent variable. In Appendix Table A.15, we conduct a long-difference estimation.
31We use data from the OECD. Importantly, not all countries have government-mandated minimum
wages and for some countries, we follow the literature and use sectorally bargained minimum wages.
See details in Appendix A.5. We do not use the minimum wage as an instrument for low-skill wages
because it would be inconsistent: if low-skill wages are endogenous, then high-skill wages are likely
endogenous too so that we would need a second instrument.
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To allow for zeros in the number of patents, we use the arcsinh transformation and we
construct ten 5-year overlapping differences from our 15 years of data. Panel A focuses
on firms which patented at least once over the time period considered (now 1995-2013),
mirroring what a Poisson regression would do. We find a positive effect of low-skill
wages and a negative effect of high-skill wages, although in some specifications the
positive effect of low-skill wage is non-significant (in unreported regressions we find that
the inverse skill premium always has a positive and significant effect). The diminished
significance of low-skill wages reflects the noisy behavior of one-time patenters: Panel
B restricts attention to firms which have patented at least twice and recovers the same
results as in our Poisson regressions: the change in low-skill wages has a large and
significant positive effect on the change of automation innovations. These results suggest
that automation responds to medium-run changes in wages.
Additional robustness checks. Our regressions include the stock of automation
innovations and therefore may suffer from Nickell’s bias. Appendix Table A.16 removes
this variable or uses the usual method of Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999)
method, which proxies for the fixed effect with the firm’s pre-sample average of the
dependent variable. We obtain very similar results.
Appendix Table A.17 investigates whether our results are robust when focusing on
patents of higher quality and weighs patents by citations. We add to each patent the
number of citations received within 5 years normalized by technological field and year of
application. The results are weaker with total wages and country-year fixed effects but
are very similar to the case without weighing patents in our preferred specification with
foreign wages and country-year fixed effects.
Appendix Table A.18 shows that our results (using foreign wages and country-year
fixed effects) are robust to using different deflators, converting in USD every year or re-
placing manufacturing wages by total wages. Firms of different sizes may be on different
trends in automation innovation. In Appendix Table A.19, we group firms into four bins
according to their number of automation patents in 1995, allow for bin-year fixed effects
and find similar results.
6 Event study: the Hartz reforms in Germany
To complement our previous analysis on global wages, we now focus on one specific
exogenous labor-market shock: the Hartz reforms. The Hartz reforms were a series of
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labor-market reforms in Germany designed from 2002 onward and implemented between
January 1st 2003 and January 1st 2005. These reforms were the major macroeconomic
shock in Germany at the time. They aimed at reducing unemployment and increasing
labor-market flexibility by reforming employment agencies to provide better job-search
assistance, deregulating temporary work, offering wage subsidies for hard-to-place work-
ers, reducing or removing social contributions on low-paid jobs and reducing long-term
unemployment benefits. The reforms have been widely credited with playing a major
role in the remarkable performance of the German labor market since, in particular, for
increasing labor supply and improving matching efficiency (see e.g. Krause and Uhlig,
2012). In line with the framework of Section 3, such reforms are predicted to reduce
the incentive to automate low-skill labor by reducing labor costs (directly through social
contribution and indirectly through an increase in labor supply) but also by allowing for
more flexible contracts and reducing the expected cost of vacancies.
We use an analogous approach as before to measure innovation and firm’s exposure
to international markets, but we exclude German firms as they are likely to have been
affected by the Hartz reforms through other channels than the labor costs faced by their
customers. We run the following regression, over the years 1997–2014:
PATAut,i,t = exp (βDE · δtωi,DE + βKa lnKAut,i,t−2 + βKo lnKother,i,t−2 + δi + δc,t) + εi,t.
We keep a 2-year lag to the innovation stocks. As before PATAut,i,t is a count of automa-
tion patents, KAut,i,t−2 and Kother,i,t−2 represent firm knowledge stocks, δi a firm fixed
effect and δc,t a country-year fixed effect. ωi,DE is the fixed firm weight on Germany and
δt is a set of year dummies (with 2005 as the excluded year). βDE is the full vector of
coefficients of interest which determines by how much more a firm exposed to Germany
tends to do more automation patents in a given year relative to 2005.
Figure 5.a reports the results. The value of −2.3 in 2010 means that on average a firm
with a German weight of 0.1 (the mean value is 0.106) engaged in a 20% smaller increase
in automation innovations between 2005 and 2010 than a firm with no German exposure.
From 2000 till 2004, firms highly exposed to Germany increased their propensity to
introduce automation innovations, such a pre-trend is not surprising in this context since
firms exposed to Germany are by definition exposed to different shocks than others. This
trend reversed between 2006 and 2009 and resumed from 2010. This is consistent with
the Hartz reform increasing labor supply from 2003 onwards and therefore decreasing

























































































(b) Effect of German exposure on au-
tomation innovations relative to
other machinery innovations.
Figure 5: Effect of German exposure on automation innovations. Panel (a) reports coefficients on
the interaction between the German weight and a set of year fixed effects in a Poisson regression
of auto95 innovations controlling for a full set of fixed effects and firm innovation stocks with
2153 firms. Panel (b) reports coefficients on the triple interaction between the German weight,
a dummy for auto95 innovations and a set of year fixed effects in a Poisson regression of auto95
and other machinery innovations controlling for a full set of fixed effects, firm innovation stocks
and the interaction between the German weight and a set of year fixed effects with 6452 firms.
of the Great Recession which had a lower impact on German labor markets than in
other countries potentially increasing the relative incentive to undertake automation
innovations (with an effect 2 years later).
The previous figure clearly shows that the behavior of firms highly exposed to Ger-
many differs over time from that of other firms. To show that the trends above are
specific to automation innovations, we run the following regression:
PATk,i,t = exp
(
βDE · δtωi,DE + βautDE · δtωi,DE1k=aut




k denotes the type of an innovation which is either auto95 or another machinery innova-
tion, δk,i represents a full set of innovation type firm fixed effects, δk,c,t innovation type
country year fixed effects and 1k=aut is a dummy for an auto95 innovation. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the firm level. βautDE is the vector of coefficients of interests. For each
year, they measure how much exposure to Germany increases the relative propensity
to introduce automation innovations instead of other forms of machinery innovations
compared to 2005. Figure 5.b reports the results: the pattern is, if anything, more
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Table 13: Innovation and exposure to Germany





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
time trend*dummy auto95*German exposure 0.6035*** 0.6037*** 0.7453** 0.0935*** 0.6331*** 0.6034***
(0.2294) (0.2089) (0.3703) (0.0345) (0.2266) (0.2137)
time trend*dummy auto95*post_2003*German exposure -1.2012*** -1.2039*** -1.2942*** -0.1791** -1.2580*** -1.1875***
(0.3965) (0.3776) (0.4775) (0.0727) (0.4075) (0.3840)
dummy auto95*post_2003*German exposure -0.6836
(1.0374)
time trend*dummy low auto*German exposure -0.0260
(0.1236)
time trend*dummy low auto*post_2003*German exposure 0.0647
(0.1768)
year dummy*German exposure Y Y Y Y Y Y
rm innovation stocks * innovation types N Y Y Y Y Y
rm *innovation types xed eects Y Y Y Y Y Y
country * year * innovation types xed eects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 77456 77456 77456 77456 62173 107284
Firms 5427 5427 5427 5427 4350 5427
Note: Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions xed-eects (HHG). All regressions control for
year dummies times the measure of German exposure, innovation stocks (and dummies for no stocks) times the innovation types, rm innovation types
xed eects and country year innovation types xed eects. The innovation stocks are lagged by two periods. Innovation types are auto95 and all other
machinery innovations (low auto and other machinery together) in columns (1) to (4), auto95 and low auto in column (5), and auto95, low auto and other
machinery in column (6). German exposure is measured by the German weights in all regressions except for column (4) where it is replaced by a dummy
signaling that the rm is in the top quartile of Germany exposed rms. Standard errors are clustered at the rm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1
pronounced than in Figure 5.a.
To formally test that the Hartz reform created a trend break in the relative propensity
of firms highly exposed to Germany to introduce automation innovation relative to other
machinery innovation, we replace the full set of year fixed-effects δt in β
aut
DE ·δtωi,DE1k=aut
in equation (5) with a time trend t− 2005 and a time trend interacted with a post 2005
dummy (t − 2005)t>2005. We focus on the years 2000-2010 to have a panel centered on
2005 and avoid the Great Recession. This exercise is akin to a triple diff except that
our treatment is distributed continuously (depending on the exposure of each firm to
Germany). Table 13 reports the result. Column (2) corresponds exactly to (5): there is
a significant time trend in the effect of German exposure on the relative propensity to
carry automation innovation between 2000 and 2005, but this trend sharply reverses in
the following five years. Column (1) omits the controls for the stock variables. Columns
(3) tests whether there is also a shift in level and does not find one. Column (4) replaces
the German weight by a dummy indicating that the firm is in the top quartile of German
exposure. Column (5) uses the low-automation innovations of section 5.3 instead of all
other machinery innovations. Finally, column (6) considers three types of innovations by
separating non-auto95 machinery innovations into the low-automation innovations of the
previous columns and the rest. In all cases, the trend break remains with a consistent
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magnitude (since the 75th percentile of German weight is 0.16). Overall, this exercise
shows that, in line with our theory, the Hartz reforms reduced automation innovation of
foreign firms highly exposed to Germany, both in absolute terms and relative to other
types of machinery innovation.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we identify automation patents and thereby provide a new measure of
automation. Our measure is available at a highly disaggregated level and covers a broad
range of technologies. Further, it predicts a decline in routine tasks across US sectors. We
then use our classification to analyze the effect of labor market conditions on automation
innovations in machinery. We first use global data and find that automation innovations
are very responsive to changes in low-skill wages with elasticities between 2 and 5. We
proceed to show that the German Hartz reforms led to a relative decrease in automation
innovations by foreign firms with a high exposure to Germany. Though using different
variations in the data, both exercises emphasize that automation innovations are much
more responsive to changes in labor market conditions than other innovations.
These results suggest that policies which increase labor costs for low-skill workers
will lead to an increase in innovations which save on them. Therefore, with endogenous
technological change, such policies are likely to be less costly for the economy in terms
of overall welfare, but also to introduce additional negative effects for low-skill workers.
Our paper provides a building block toward estimating by how much a policy-induced
increase in low-skill wages would be undone in a couple of years through innovation.
Future research could also adapt our classification method to automation patents
beyond machinery. This would allow for an analysis of automation in the service industry
or automation of high-skill tasks through Artificial Intelligence.
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Figure A.1: Share of biadic patent applications in the different technical fields in 1997-2011

















(a) Share of automation patents in machinery out
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Figure A.3: Trends in automation (for biadic applications)
Table A.1: Summary statistics on the prevalence of keywords
IPC/CPC 6 digit IPC4 + (G05 or G06) IPC4 pairs
Share all robot automat* CNC labor all robot automat* CNC labor all robot automat* CNC labor
Mean 20.9 4.3 11.2 2.4 5.9 53.2 15.4 32.4 11.2 9.5 18.5 4.5 8.8 1.8 5.4
S. d. 14.4 8.4 9.5 5.8 3.7 19.3 17.7 11 16.5 3.8 16.3 10 9.9 4.7 3.8
p25 10.5 0.8 4.2 0 3.3 40 6.7 26.6 0.8 2.6 7.7 0.6 2.5 0 2.6
p50 18 2 8.7 0.4 5.3 54.3 10 31.9 3 4.6 13.6 1.8 5.2 0.4 4.6
p75 26.6 4.5 15.3 1.8 7.7 63.8 16 40.3 15.5 7.3 23 4.2 10.7 1.4 7.3
p90 38.7 9.1 24.3 6.1 10.4 77.9 36.4 43.3 38.2 10.4 36.8 8.9 21.7 4.4 10.4
p95 47.7 13.7 29.4 12.7 12.7 85.6 44.3 45.2 55.3 12.3 51.8 14.5 31 7.7 12.3
p99 75 35.8 43.8 33.1 17.9 90.1 82.9 59.9 56.6 17.9 84.5 60 45.3 23.1 17.9
Note: This table computes summary statistics on the share of patents with any automation keywords, robot keywords, automat* keywords, CNC keywords or
labor keywords for each type of technological categories (6 digit codes, pairs of 4 digit codes and combinations of ipc4 codes with G05 or G06) within machinery
with at least 100 patents.
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Table A.2: Industry of innovators
Industry Share auto95 (%) Share firms (%)
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2.18 3.45
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1.18 4.39
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 22.83 7.42
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 9.19 2.76
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 24.52 20.97
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 5.31 3.48
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 4.5 1.2
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1.34 3.3
64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 1.75 0.96
72 Scientific research and development 2.04 2.37
Other industries 13.23 27.15
No information on industry 11.94 22.5
Notes: The table reports the industry of manufacturing of firms included in our baseline regression with industry-year fixed
effects at the NACEv2 division level and the share of biadic auto95 families for each industry. Industries representing less than
1% of patents are summed up in the "Other industries" category.
1
46
Table A.3: Correlation matrix
Low-skill wage Middle-skill wage High-skill wage GDP gap GDP per capita Labor productivity
Low-skill wage 1.00
Middle-skill wage 0.94 1.00
High-skill wage 0.60 0.75 1.00
GDP gap -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 1.00
GDP per capita 0.70 0.80 0.73 0.11 1.00
Labor productivity 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.04 0.66 1.00
Note: Correlation of residuals for the auto95 sample controlling for firm and year-industry fixed effects.
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Table A.4: Top 10 auto95 innovators in our sample
Company
Number of biadic auto95
patents in 1997-2011
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 1738
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 810
Fanuc Co. 777
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 706
Robert Bosch GmbH 655
Mitsubishi Electric Co. 652
Tokyo Electron, Ltd. 578
Murata Machinery, Ltd. 501
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba 473
General Electric Company 464
1
Table A.5: Baseline regressions for auto95 with country-level clustering
Dependent variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.21∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 3.59∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.73) (0.63) (0.61) (0.77) (0.70) (0.65) (0.74) (1.04)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
{0.000} {0.002} {0.030} {0.031} {0.038} {0.094} {0.008} {0.019} {0.015}
High-skill wage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP gap Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor productivity Yes Yes
GDP per capita Yes Yes
Stocks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spillovers Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+Y F+Y F+Y F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY
Observations 50115 50115 50115 49174 49174 49174 49174 49174 49174
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3329 3329 3329 3329 3329 3329
Note: This table reproduces the baseline table but clusters standard errors at the country-level. [ ] brackets corre-
spond to the p-value associated with estimated standard errors, { } brackets correspond to the p-values associated




Table A.6: Auto90 innovations
Dependent variable Auto90
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.19∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗ 1.57∗ 1.57∗ 2.61∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗∗ 3.46∗∗
(0.65) (0.67) (0.77) (0.81) (0.87) (1.03) (1.12) (1.30) (1.42)
High-skill wage -1.85∗∗∗ -2.27∗∗∗ -0.85 -1.78∗∗ -1.76∗ -1.09 -3.50∗∗∗ -2.80∗∗ -3.24∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.65) (0.65) (0.80) (0.91) (0.85) (1.14) (1.30) (1.22)
GDP gap -3.85∗ -4.41∗∗ -1.53 4.47 4.49 6.23 -0.95 0.06 -0.09
(2.10) (2.14) (2.25) (5.20) (5.29) (5.37) (3.25) (3.52) (3.66)
Labor productivity 0.95 -0.03 -1.11
(0.73) (1.29) (1.32)
GDP per capita -2.60∗∗ -2.55∗ -0.79
(1.03) (1.45) (1.53)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 72721 72721 72721 72439 72439 72439 72439 72439 72439
Firms 4890 4890 4890 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by
conditional Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and industry-year fixed effects, while (4)-(9) include
firm, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. In Columns (7)–(9) the macroeconomic variables are the normalized foreign variables
previously defined. Stock and spillover variables are calculated with respect to the dependent variable (auto90). Standard errors are
clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Wages weighted by inventor weights
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.99∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗ 2.30∗∗ 3.44∗∗∗ 5.53∗∗∗ 6.39∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗
(0.87) (0.92) (1.08) (1.03) (1.17) (1.32) (1.63) (1.81) (2.08)
Low-skill wage (iw) -0.22 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.26 0.14 0.00 0.74 0.71
(0.44) (0.45) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) (0.47) (0.53) (0.58) (0.54)
High-skill wage -2.59∗∗∗ -3.45∗∗∗ -2.04∗∗ -3.02∗∗∗ -2.60∗∗ -2.15∗∗ -5.15∗∗∗ -4.53∗∗∗ -5.66∗∗∗
(0.85) (0.93) (0.87) (1.02) (1.09) (1.08) (1.58) (1.65) (1.67)
High-skill wage (iw) 0.41 0.90∗∗ 0.58 0.18 0.60 0.24 -0.27 1.01∗ 0.21
(0.39) (0.43) (0.40) (0.37) (0.41) (0.39) (0.47) (0.52) (0.51)
GDP gap -8.38∗∗ -9.83∗∗∗ -6.89∗ 1.83 1.69 4.16 -2.28 -1.22 -3.06
(3.67) (3.66) (3.85) (6.02) (5.97) (6.28) (4.26) (4.27) (4.72)
GDP gap (iw) 3.25 3.89 3.52 1.94 2.43 2.05 2.50 3.35∗ 3.89
(2.51) (2.41) (2.64) (2.68) (2.49) (2.83) (2.29) (1.86) (2.38)
Labor productivity 2.10∗ -0.91 -1.54
(1.12) (1.75) (1.62)
Labor productivity (iw) -1.14∗∗ -1.02∗ -2.08∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.54) (0.65)
GDP per capita -1.27 -3.16∗ 0.81
(1.43) (1.86) (2.29)
GDP per capita (iw) -0.66 -0.29 -1.41∗∗
(0.59) (0.63) (0.61)
Stock automation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock other Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 48376 48376 48376 47977 47977 47977 36234 36234 36234
Firms 3274 3274 3274 3268 3268 3268 2480 2480 2480
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG) in Columns (1), (3), and (5). In Columns (2), (4), and (6), estimation is done by Poisson regressions
where the firm fixed effects are replaced by the pre-sample mean, following Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999, BGVR). All columns
include industry-year fixed effects and Columns (3) to (6) include country-year fixed effects. In Columns (5) and (6) the macroeconomic




Table A.8: Predicting weights using subsequent wages
Panel A
Dependent variable ωi,c,1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
gLSW,2000 -0.14 -0.14 -0.27 -0.14 -0.14 -0.27 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13
(0.12) (0.12) (0.28) (0.12) (0.12) (0.28) (0.12) (0.12) (0.29)
gHSW,2000 0.13 0.13 0.01
(0.24) (0.24) (0.27)
Firm xed eect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Clustering C C C F + C F + C F + C C C C
Observations 136981 136981 136981 136981 136981 136981 136981 136981 136981
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Panel B
Dependent variable foreign_ωi,c,1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
gLSW,2000 -0.10 -0.10 -0.31 -0.10 -0.10 -0.31 -0.10 -0.10 -0.33
(0.11) (0.11) (0.26) (0.11) (0.11) (0.26) (0.12) (0.12) (0.30)
gHSW,2000 0.20 0.20 0.23
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24)
Firm xed eect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Clustering C C C F + C F + C F + C C C C
Observations 133640 133640 133640 133640 133640 133640 133640 133640 133640
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Note: OLS regressions of rm-level weights/foreign weights on country growth rates for low-skill and high-skill
wages between 1995 and 2000. Columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9) include rm xed eects. Columns (7)-
(9) weigh observations by the number of auto95 patents between 1997 and 2011. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-level for columns (1)-(3), (7)-(9)and clustered at both the country and rm levels for (4)-(6). *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Alternative weights
Dependent variable Auto95
1970–1989 1985–1994 start 2000 GDP 0 GDP 1 (wL · L)0.35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign:
Low-skill wage 5.07∗∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗ 6.81∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗ 5.81∗∗∗ 5.11∗∗∗
(1.88) (1.48) (2.10) (1.37) (1.68) (1.50)
High-skill wage -3.41∗∗ -1.51 -3.56∗ -3.74∗∗∗ -3.19∗∗ -3.40∗∗
(1.66) (1.52) (2.03) (1.32) (1.62) (1.32)
GDP gap 1.70 2.19 -0.47 -3.44 -1.83 -1.19
(4.13) (4.72) (3.78) (3.56) (3.85) (3.66)
Labor productivity -2.03 -3.53∗∗ -4.38∗∗ -1.29 -1.59 -2.03
(1.75) (1.58) (1.74) (1.42) (1.57) (1.55)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 34710 44476 26577 48665 48802 48679
Firms 2386 3031 2695 3323 3322 3325
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two pe-
riods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm,
country-year and industry-year fixed effects. In column (1) firms’ country weights for the macroeco-
nomic variables are computed over the period 1970–1989; and over the period 1985–1994 for column (2).
Columns (3) to (6) use the baseline pre-sample period of 1970–1994. Column (3) restricts the sample to
the years 2000–2009. Column (4) does not adjust for GDP in the computation of the weights; Column
(5) uses GDP instead of GDP 0.35 to adjust for country size and Column (6) replaces GDP with total
low-skilled payment wL in the baseline formula. In all columns the macroeconomic variables are the nor-
malized foreign variables previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Excluding one country at the time
Dependent Variable Auto95
Excl. country None US DE JP GB FR IT ES
Average weight 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.03
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foreign:
Low-skill wage 5.08*** 5.41*** 3.60*** 3.43*** 4.78*** 3.60** 5.20*** 4.84***
(1.54) (1.68) (1.37) (1.33) (1.33) (1.48) (1.45) (1.51)
High-skill wage -2.95** -2.74* -1.72 -1.57 -0.82 -2.31* -4.62** -2.51*
(1.46) (1.46) (1.26) (1.29) (1.34) (1.33) (1.90) (1.48)
GDP gap 1.29 0.73 2.62 1.59 1.99 0.97 1.19 1.05
(4.84) (5.14) (5.58) (3.88) (4.85) (5.02) (5.13) (4.90)
Labor productivity -2.15 -3.39** -2.26 -1.43 -3.24** -1.49 -0.73 -2.35
(1.58) (1.67) (1.39) (1.48) (1.58) (1.48) (1.63) (1.56)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed eects F+CY+IY F+CY+IY F+CY+IY F+CY+IY F+CY+IY F+CY+IY F+CY+IY F+CY+IY
Control ωc ∗ Y ωc ∗ Y ωc ∗ Y ωc ∗ Y ωc ∗ Y ωc ∗ Y ωc ∗ Y
Observations 48773 47997 48319 48594 48391 48713 48638 48702
Firms 3324 3270 3291 3312 3299 3320 3315 3319
Notes: Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by con-
ditional Poisson xed-eects regressions eects (HHG). All columns include rm, industry-year and country-year xed eects. In Column
(0), the macroeconomic variables are the normalized foreign variables previously dened. Columns (1) to (7) further exclude the country
in the column header in addition to the domestic country when computing the normalized foreign macroeconomic variables. Columns (1)
to (7) also control for the weight of the header-country times year dummies. The average weight is the average country weight for rms
in the sample of Column (0). Standard errors are clustered at the rm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.16: Addressing Nickell’s bias
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low-skill wage 2.64∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 4.71∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.83) (1.05) (1.08) (1.42) (1.39)
High-skill wage -2.46∗∗∗ -0.81 -2.30∗∗ -1.26 -2.78∗∗ -1.55
(0.77) (0.79) (0.99) (1.00) (1.39) (1.50)
GDP gap -4.71∗ -2.66 4.51 8.28 0.73 1.20
(2.73) (3.52) (7.05) (7.72) (4.92) (5.47)
Labor productivity 0.81 0.09 -1.32 -1.90 -1.66 -1.53
(0.90) (1.04) (1.67) (1.53) (1.48) (1.52)
Stock automation No Yes No Yes No Yes
Stock other Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Estimator HHG BGVR HHG BGVR HHG BGVR
Observations 49174 49174 48773 48787 48773 48787
Firms 3329 3329 3324 3326 3324 3326
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by
two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG) in columns (1),
(3), and (5). In columns (2), (4), and (6), estimation is done by Poisson regressions where the firm
fixed effects are replaced by the pre-sample mean, following Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen
(1999, BGVR). Columns (1) and (2) include year-industry fixed effects and columns (3) to (6)
include year-industry and country-year fixed effects. In Columns (5) and (6) the macroeconomic
variables are the normalized foreign variables previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1
50
Table A.11: Lags and leads
Dependent variable Auto95
Lags (Leads) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low-skill wage 2.08∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 1.48∗
(0.76) (0.78) (0.81) (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) (0.84) (0.82)
High-skill wage -1.23∗ -2.16∗∗∗ -3.04∗∗∗ -2.61∗∗∗ -2.75∗∗∗ -3.12∗∗∗ -2.94∗∗∗ -2.80∗∗∗
(0.74) (0.76) (0.78) (0.79) (0.76) (0.81) (0.76) (0.72)
Labor productivity 1.17 1.46∗ 2.11∗∗ 0.91 0.54 0.11 0.03 0.51
(0.81) (0.84) (0.88) (0.92) (0.89) (0.91) (0.93) (0.92)
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY
Observations 46783 47422 48514 49174 49657 50216 51262 52659
Firms 3156 3202 3279 3329 3368 3412 3490 3587
Panel B: country-year fixed effects
Low-skill wage 1.81∗ 1.89∗ 2.15∗ 2.55∗∗ 2.27∗∗ 2.04∗ 1.85 0.88
(1.03) (1.10) (1.10) (1.13) (1.13) (1.12) (1.15) (1.10)
High-skill wage -0.05 -1.32 -1.98∗ -2.16∗∗ -2.51∗∗ -3.17∗∗∗ -2.95∗∗∗ -2.19∗∗
(1.20) (1.12) (1.03) (1.05) (1.15) (1.15) (1.06) (1.07)
Labor productivity -1.91 -1.03 -0.70 -1.68 -0.92 -0.17 0.13 -0.13
(1.65) (1.58) (1.58) (1.76) (1.85) (1.75) (1.69) (1.57)
Panel C: country-year fixed effects and foreign variables
Low-skill wage 2.41 3.04∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 3.82∗∗ 2.80∗ 2.55 1.62
(1.50) (1.52) (1.55) (1.54) (1.55) (1.65) (1.76) (1.77)
High-skill wage 0.41 -2.12 -3.30∗∗ -2.95∗∗ -4.08∗∗∗ -5.03∗∗∗ -5.07∗∗∗ -3.71∗∗
(1.53) (1.50) (1.48) (1.46) (1.56) (1.56) (1.52) (1.58)
Labor productivity -1.77 -0.61 -0.92 -2.15 0.35 2.07 2.57 1.78
(1.64) (1.65) (1.61) (1.58) (1.60) (1.71) (1.76) (1.78)
Fixed effects F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 46461 47136 48172 48773 49236 49810 50857 52253
Firms 3156 3202 3277 3324 3361 3406 3484 3584
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. Each panel represents a different regression. All regressions contain controls for
GDP gap, stocks and spillovers, for which we do not report the coefficients. The independent variables (wages, labor productiv-
ity, GDP gap and spillovers) are lagged by the number of periods indicated in lag, except for the stock variables which are always
lagged by 2 periods. Estimation is done by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Panel A regressions contain firm and
industry-year fixed effects. Panels B and C add country-year fixed effects. In Panel C the macroeconomic variables are their foreign
normalized values previously definted. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Placebo regressions: long leads
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
t + 5 t + 10 t + 15 t + 5 t + 10 t + 15 t + 5 t + 10 t + 15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage -0.34 -1.77 -1.39 -0.41 -1.35 -1.71∗∗ 0.65 2.44 0.81
(0.79) (1.08) (1.13) (0.66) (0.83) (0.78) (1.32) (1.78) (1.95)
High-skill wage 1.83∗∗ 0.53 -0.64 0.12 0.68 -0.33 2.62∗∗ -1.36 -1.67
(0.89) (1.54) (1.27) (0.58) (0.89) (0.81) (1.19) (2.03) (2.03)
GDP gap -0.91 3.36 3.24 -4.01 -0.34 7.88∗∗∗ 2.05 7.82∗ 5.61
(8.66) (6.29) (5.70) (3.17) (2.64) (3.04) (4.14) (4.41) (4.12)
Labor productivity -1.04 1.27 -0.38 0.61 -0.07 -0.57 -2.33∗ -4.24∗∗∗ -2.51
(1.14) (1.91) (1.73) (0.77) (0.94) (0.96) (1.29) (1.47) (1.54)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 51124 59393 62059 51506 59917 62670 51124 59393 62059
Firms 3850 4177 4284 3859 4183 4290 3850 4177 4284
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are led by 5 periods (Columns (1), (4) and (5)),
10 periods (Columns (2), (5) and (8)) or 15 periods (Columns (3), (6) and (9)), except the stock variables which are lagged by
two periods. Estimation is done by conditional Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and industry-
year fixed effects, while (4)-(9) include firm, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. In Columns (7)–(9), the macroeconomic
variables are the normalized foreign variables previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.13: Predicted wages
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.38∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 1.60∗ 1.47 1.61∗ 3.79∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗
(0.80) (0.81) (0.81) (0.92) (1.01) (0.93) (1.28) (1.37) (1.29)
High-skill wage -2.77∗∗∗ -4.79∗∗∗ -2.81∗∗∗ -3.38∗∗∗ -3.78∗∗∗ -3.39∗∗∗ -4.35∗∗∗ -3.79∗∗ -4.34∗∗∗
(0.81) (1.08) (0.82) (1.01) (1.38) (1.02) (1.31) (1.52) (1.32)
GDP gap -4.90∗ -4.23∗ -4.95∗ 4.10 4.09 4.11 -0.86 -0.36 -0.81
(2.56) (2.51) (2.56) (6.78) (6.79) (6.78) (4.45) (4.51) (4.49)
Labor productivity 2.92∗∗∗ 0.59 -0.92
(0.95) (1.54) (1.48)
GDP per capita 0.12 0.02 -0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 49174 49174 49174 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773
Firms 3329 3329 3329 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by
conditional Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG). We estimate for each country an AR(1) process with time trends for wages, labor
productivity, and GDP per capita. We then use the estimated process to predict with the information available at time t-2 the average
values between the years t+2 and t+7, which are in turn the independent variables in these regressions. Columns (1)-(3) include firm
and industry-year fixed effects, while (4)-(9) include firm, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. In Columns (7)–(9) the macroe-
conomic variables are the normalized foreign variables previously defined. Stock and spillover variables are calculated with respect to
the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.14: Minimum wage
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Minimum wage 2.10∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 1.79∗∗ 1.92∗∗ 1.92∗ 2.15∗ 2.20∗ 0.92
(0.62) (0.63) (0.78) (0.88) (0.92) (1.04) (1.17) (1.24) (1.38)
High-skill wage -1.88∗∗∗ -2.50∗∗∗ -1.86∗∗ -3.69∗∗∗ -3.17∗∗∗ -3.46∗∗ -3.35∗∗ -3.19∗ -5.35∗∗∗
(0.66) (0.79) (0.82) (1.01) (1.22) (1.40) (1.36) (1.84) (1.85)
GDP gap -2.99 -3.89 -2.96 7.05 7.72 7.55 2.79 2.97 -2.52
(2.46) (2.55) (2.74) (6.42) (6.50) (7.00) (4.72) (5.21) (6.10)
Labor productivity 1.22 -0.94 -0.20
(0.79) (1.48) (1.62)
GDP per capita -0.04 -0.47 4.11∗
(1.22) (1.98) (2.49)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 49129 49129 49129 48757 48757 48757 47577 47577 47577
Firms 3326 3326 3326 3322 3322 3322 3237 3237 3237
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by
conditional Poisson fixed effects regressions (HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and year-industry fixed effects, while (4)-(9) include
firm, year-industry, and country-year fixed effects. In Columns (7)–(9) the macroeconomic variables are the normalized foreign variables
previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.17: Citations-weighted patents
Dependent variable Citations-weighted auto95
Domestic+Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.06∗∗ 1.79 3.28∗∗∗ 1.28 1.62 3.53∗∗ 3.39∗∗ 4.16∗∗ 3.80∗
(1.00) (1.10) (1.14) (1.22) (1.45) (1.50) (1.72) (1.87) (2.21)
High-skill wage -2.38∗∗ -2.88∗∗∗ -0.97 -3.26∗∗ -2.41∗ -1.71 -4.00∗∗ -3.02 -3.77∗∗
(0.96) (0.99) (1.07) (1.27) (1.30) (1.40) (1.64) (1.89) (1.76)
GDP gap -3.80 -4.47 -0.74 0.53 1.75 4.62 -0.69 1.01 0.11
(3.15) (3.36) (3.26) (7.80) (7.97) (7.98) (5.06) (5.47) (5.71)
Labor productivity 1.15 -1.90 -1.63
(1.23) (2.29) (1.80)
GDP per capita -3.54∗∗ -5.60∗∗ -0.71
(1.63) (2.35) (2.61)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 49174 49174 49174 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773
Firms 3329 3329 3329 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is done by
conditional Poisson fixed-effects regressions (HHG). Patents are citations-weighted: we add to each patent the number of citations re-
ceived within 5 years normalized by technological field and year of application. Columns (1)-(3) include firm and industry-year fixed
effects, while (4)-(9) include firm, industry-year, and country-year fixed effects. In Columns (7)–(9) the macroeconomic variables are
the normalized foreign variables previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1
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Table A.15: Five-year difference estimation
Dependent Variable ∆ Arcsinhauto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Firms which patented at least once in 1995-2013
∆ Low-skill wage 0.94*** 0.91*** 0.98*** 0.70** 0.59 0.49 1.10** 0.74 0.46
(0.27) (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (0.37) (0.43) (0.49) (0.56) (0.61)
∆ High-skill wage -0.95*** -1.00*** -0.91*** -0.99*** -1.21*** -1.14*** -1.20** -1.62*** -1.60***
(0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.40) (0.38) (0.51) (0.58) (0.54)
∆ GDP gap -1.45 -1.55 -1.38 -0.19 -0.50 -0.36 -0.41 -1.27 -1.80
(1.07) (1.07) (1.15) (2.18) (2.19) (2.22) (1.42) (1.65) (1.74)
∆ Labor productivity 0.12 0.50 0.75
(0.39) (0.59) (0.56)
∆ GDP per capita -0.10 0.54 1.22*
(0.44) (0.60) (0.66)
Fixed eects IY IY IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY
Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35310 35310 35310 35280 35280 35280 35280 35280 35280
Firms 3531 3531 3531 3528 3528 3528 3528 3528 3528
Panel B: Firms which patented at least twice in 1995-2013
∆ Low-skill wage 1.87*** 1.86*** 1.87*** 1.42*** 1.40** 1.26* 2.43*** 1.96** 1.74*
(0.43) (0.47) (0.53) (0.54) (0.60) (0.70) (0.76) (0.88) (0.96)
∆ High-skill wage -1.74*** -1.75*** -1.74*** -1.88*** -1.92*** -2.00*** -2.36*** -2.91*** -2.79***
(0.39) (0.44) (0.45) (0.56) (0.64) (0.61) (0.77) (0.89) (0.84)
∆ GDP gap -2.38 -2.39 -2.37 -2.06 -2.11 -2.19 -0.81 -1.92 -2.29
(1.46) (1.47) (1.60) (3.20) (3.24) (3.28) (2.09) (2.46) (2.61)
∆ Labor productivity 0.02 0.09 0.96
(0.60) (0.94) (0.89)
∆ GDP per capita -0.01 0.42 1.28
(0.71) (0.98) (1.06)
Fixed eects IY IY IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY CY + IY
Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22650 22650 22650 22630 22630 22630 22630 22630 22630
Firms 2265 2265 2265 2263 2263 2263 2263 2263 2263
Note: Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is done by OLS. t = 2000 − 2009: The dependent variable is the dif-
ference between the arcsinh of the sum of yearly auto95 patents in t to t + 4 and the arcsinh of the sum of yearly auto95 patents in t− 5
to t− 1. Columns (1)-(3) include industry-year xed eect, while (4)-(9) include industry-year and country-year xed eects. In Columns
(7) to (9) the macroeconomic variables are the normalized foreign variables previously dened. All the independent variables are the sum
of yearly counterparts from t− 4 to t. Standard errors are clustered at the rm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.18: Wages and deflators
Dependent variable Auto95
Sector Manufacturing Total









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign:
Low-skill wage 5.00∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗ 5.23∗ 4.75∗∗
(1.51) (1.41) (1.93) (2.80) (2.03)
High-skill wage -2.68∗ -3.60∗∗ -2.58∗ -2.58 -3.43
(1.38) (1.42) (1.48) (2.27) (2.23)
GDP gap 1.53 0.49 1.40 0.15 -0.52
(4.78) (4.82) (4.84) (4.42) (4.55)
Labor productivity -2.40 -1.10 -2.32 -2.85 -2.24
(1.51) (1.56) (1.62) (3.06) (2.90)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY F+IY+CY
Observations 48773 48773 48773 48773 48773
Firms 3324 3324 3324 3324 3324
Note: All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. Columns (1) to (3) use manufacturing
wages and Columns (4) and (5) on total wages. In Column (1), macroeconomic variables are deflated with the local manufacturing PPI and
converted to USD in 2005. In Columns (2) and (5) they are converted to USD every year and deflated with the US manufacturing PPI. In
Column (3), macroeconomic variables are deflated with the local GDP deflator and converted to USD in 1995. In Column (4), macroeconomic
variables are deflated with the local manufacturing PPI and converted to USD in 1995. In all columns, the macroeconomic variables are the
normalized foreign variables previously defined. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A.19: Firm bin size - year fixed effects
Dependent Variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 3.03*** 2.78*** 3.56*** 2.31** 2.70** 3.57*** 4.34*** 5.51*** 4.36**
(0.79) (0.84) (0.95) (0.98) (1.12) (1.24) (1.31) (1.54) (1.77)
High-skill wage -2.29*** -2.70*** -1.77** -2.85*** -2.01* -2.02* -4.52*** -2.87* -4.50***
(0.71) (0.77) (0.79) (0.94) (1.07) (1.04) (1.32) (1.47) (1.40)
GDP gap -3.32 -3.89 -2.11 3.95 5.01 6.11 -0.68 1.78 -0.63
(2.67) (2.78) (2.83) (6.76) (6.80) (7.06) (4.54) (4.81) (5.15)
Labor productivity 0.99 -1.92 -2.67*
(0.90) (1.77) (1.62)
GDP per capita -1.46 -3.09 -0.04
(1.30) (1.90) (2.06)
Stocks / Spillovers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed eects F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY F+IY
BY BY BY BY BY BY BY+CY BY+CY BY+CY
Observations 49935 49935 49935 49890 49890 49890 49890 49890 49890
Firms 3329 3329 3329 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326
Note: Marginal eects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is
done by conditional Poisson xed-eects regressions (HHG). Firms are classied into ve bins by the stock of total patents
in 1995 with 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles as four thresholds. Columns (1)-(3) include rm, indsutry-year (IY) and
bin-year (BY) xed eects, while (4)-(9) include rm, indsutry-year, bin-year and country-year xed eects. In Columns (7)
to (9) the macroeconomic variables are the normalized foreign variables previously dened. Foreign GDP gap is interacted
with the foreign weight. Standard errors are clustered at the rm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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A.2 Details on the classification of automation patents
We derived the exact list of keywords in Table 1 after experimenting extensively with
variations around them and looking at the resulting classification of technology categories
and the associated patents. Relative to the original list of technologies given in the SMT,
we did not include keywords related to information network, as these seem less related
to the automation of the production process and the patents containing words such as
“local area network” do not appear related to automation. We also did not count all
laser patents as they are not all related to automation—but we obtain patents related
to automation using laser technologies thanks to our other keywords. Furthermore, the
Y section of the CPC classification is organized differently from the rest and is only
designed to provide additional information. As a result, we ignore Y codes throughout.
A.2.1 Statistics on the classification
Table A.1 gives summary statistics on the prevalence of automation keywords across
technology categories in machinery, p(t), as well as the prevalence of the 4 main sub-
groups of keywords: automat*, robot, numerical control (CNC) and labor. The 95th and
90th percentile for the prevalence of automation keywords for 6-digit codes in machinery
define the thresholds used to categorize auto95 and auto90 patents. The distributions
are quite similar for the C/IPC 6 digit codes and for pairs of IPC 4 digit codes (see
also the histograms below). As expected, the distributions are significantly shifted to
the right for combinations of C/IPC 4-digit codes with G05 or G06. All prevalence
measures are right-skewed particularly for 6-digit codes and 4-digit pairs, and even more
for the robot and CNC patents. The automat* keywords are also more common as the
prevalence of automat* is significantly higher than for the other keywords. Yet, the dif-
ference narrows somewhat in the right tail: the 95th percentile for 6 digit codes is 29.4%
for automat* and 13.7% and 12.7% for robot and CNC. In fact, the thresholds (5 and 2)
used in the definition of the automat* keywords were chosen so that the distributions of
the prevalence measures are somewhat comparable. The right tails of the distribution
are similar for the prevalence of the robot and CNC keywords.
Figure A.4.a gives the histograms of the prevalence of automation keywords for ma-
chinery technology categories which are pairs of C/IPC 4-digit codes. The histograms
are very similar to those of C/IPC 6 digit codes in Figure 1. Figure A.4.b shows the
histograms for all combinations of machinery C/IPC 4-digit codes with G05 or G06.
The distribution is considerably shifted to the right, in line with expectations since G05
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(a) For all pairs of C/IPC 4 digit
codes within machinery with
100 patents
(b) For combinations of IPC4 in ma-
chinery with G05 G06 and at
least 100 patents
Figure A.4: Histograms of the prevalence of automation keywords. The p90 and p95 lines are
those of the 6 digit distribution and mark the thresholds used to define auto90
and auto95 technological categories.
proxies for control and G06 for algorithmic, two set of technologies which have been used
heavily in automation. There are, however, many fewer combination of these types, and
accordingly fewer patents can be characterized as automation innovations this way.
A.2.2 How are auto90 and auto95 patents identified?
Given that our classification procedure is relatively complex, we assess here which fea-
tures dominate. To do so, we focus on the set of 15, 212, 134 biadic patent applications
in 1997-2011 (corresponding to the 3, 187, 536 patent families which have patent appli-
cations in at least two countries), since this corresponds to the set on which we run
our main regressions. There are 310, 458 auto95 patent applications corresponding to
61, 768 patent families (and similarly 541, 693 auto90 patent applications corresponding
to 107, 237 patent families). Table A.20.a gives the share of biadic patents which are
identified through a C/IPC 6 digit code, a pair of 4-digit codes or a combination of
4-digit code with G05/G06 (the shares sum up to more than 100% since patents may be
identified as automation innovations in several ways). 6-digit codes are the most relevant
since they identify close to 80% of either auto90 or auto95 patents alone.
Similarly, one may wonder which keywords are the most important in identifying
automation patents. To assess that, we define robot95 patents as patents which contain
a technology category with a prevalence of “robot” keywords above the threshold used to
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Table A.20: Identification of automation technology categories
(a) Type of C/IPC codes identifying
auto90 and auto95 patents
Ipc codes / Patents Auto90 Auto95
Matches ipc6 78.2% 78.7%
Matches ipc4 pair 17.3% 24.3%
Matches ipc4 - G05/G06 combination 47.7% 47.8%
Note: Share of innovations classified as automation innova-
tion through ipc6 codes, ipc4 pairs or ipc4 - G05/G06 pairs.
Statistics computed on biadic patents from 1997-2011.
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(b) Auto patents and subcate-
gories of automation innova-
tions
Sources / Patents Auto80 Auto90 Auto95
Auto80 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Automat*80 36.2% 53.1% 72.1%
CNC80 5.0% 8.0% 13.2%
Robot80 12.0% 19.2% 33.6%
Auto90 62.4% 100.0% 100.0%
Automat*90 21.6% 34.6% 56.0%
CNC90 2.2% 3.6% 6.3%
Robot90 7.8% 12.5% 21.8%
Auto95 35.8% 57.3% 100.0%
Automat*95 4.4% 7.1% 12.4%
CNC95 1.6% 2.5% 4.4%
Robot95 6.3% 10.2% 17.7%
Note: Share of auto95 (auto90 and auto80,
respectively) innovations which are also classi-
fied as automat*80/90/95, CNC80/90/95, and
robot80/90/95 innovations. Statistics computed on
biadic patents from 1997-2011.
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define auto95 (namely 0.4766), therefore those patents are a subset of the auto95 patents.
We define CNC85, automat*95, robot90, CNC90, automat*90, robot80, CNC80 and au-
tomat*80 similarly. The other keywords are much less common. Table A.20.b reports
the share of auto95, auto90 and auto80 patents which belong to each subcategory. “Au-
tomat*” is the most important keyword since 72% of auto95 patents are also automat*80
patents. “Robot” matters as well with 33.6% of auto95 patents which are robot80 and
17.7% which are even robot95 (more than automat*95). CNC does not matter much:
only 13% of auto95 patents are CNC80.
A.2.3 Stability of the classification
To assess the stability of our classification, we redo exactly the same exercise but instead
of using EPO patents from 1978 to 2017, we restrict attention to EPO patents from the
first half of the sample (1978-1997), the second half (1998-2017) or the period of our main
regression analysis (1997-2011). There is a modest increase in the share of patents with
automation keywords within each technology category. At the C/IPC 6-digit level in
machinery, the share of patents with an automation keyword increases on average from
0.19 in the first half of the sample to 0.21 in the second half. Nevertheless, the ranking
of codes is remarkably stable as shown in Table A.21which reports the correlations of
the prevalence measures for the different time periods.
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Table A.21: Correlation between the prevalence of automation keywords for different periods
Prevalence of automation keywords using patents during the period:
1978-2017 1997-2011 1978-1997 1998-2017
1978-2017 1 . . .
1997-2011 0.9863 1 . .
1978-1997 0.9693 0.9321 1 .
1998-2017 0.9885 0.992 0.9241 1
Notes: Correlation matrix for the prevalence of automation keywords by C/IPC 6-
digit codes in machinery using EPO patents over different time periods. We exclude
catch-all categories made at the 4-digit level.
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Table A.22: Confusion table for different classification periods
Confusion Matrix
Auto95 based on the Auto95 based on the Auto95 based on the
Total1998-1997 classification 1998-2017 classification 1997-2011 classification
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Auto95 based on Yes 240,194 70,264 280,047 30,411 262,972 47,486 310,458
the 1978-2017 No 53,137 14,848,539 25,186 14,876,490 26,368 14,875,308 14,901,676
classification Total 293,331 14,918,803 305,233 14,906,901 289,340 14,922,794 15,212,134
Notes: The statistics are always computed on patents from 1997-2011.
1
Further, focusing on the same set of biadic patent applications in 1997-2011, Table
A.22 shows confusion tables on the classification of patents as auto95 according to each
of the classification period. Regardless of the time period used the number of automation
patents stays roughly constant. In particular, 85% of the baseline auto95 patents are
still auto95 if we run the classification over the years 1997-2011. This common set of
patents then represent 91% of all biadic patents classified as auto95 patents when using
the period 1997-2011 instead of the full sample.
A.3 Comparison with Mann and Puettmann (2020)
We considered the machinery (according to our definition) of Mann and Puettmann
(2020, henceforth MP) and them as auto95 or not (at the family level). We have a
lower share of automation patents (18.5% for auto90 and 10% for auto90) than MP who
have 30.8%. 70% of our auto95 patents are classified as automation patents by MP (to
analyze this number, it is useful to note that their algorithm has a 17% false negative
error rate on the training set), while we classify 22.7% of their automation patents as
auto95. Therefore, our measure of automation is generally stricter than theirs although
it is not a perfect subset.
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Figure A.5: Histograms of the share of automation patents in MP and of the prevalence of
automation keywords in this paper at the 6 digit level in machinery.
60digit level according to their classification and compare this number with our measure
of the prevalence of automation keywords. The correlation between these two measures is
high (at 0.58). Figure A.5 shows the histograms of the two distributions. Our prevalence
measure is more skewed and has a fatter tail (with a kurtosis of 7 versus 3.5), as such it
more clearly identifies a set of outliers among 6-digit C/IPC codes.
We compute the difference between our prevalence measure and their share of au-
tomation patents and look at the codes with the highest and lowest values (focusing on
codes with at least 100 patents in both their dataset and our EPO dataset). Table A.23
lists the 6 codes with the largest positive difference (among auto95 codes) and the 6
codes with the largest (in absolute value) negative difference (among non-auto90 codes).
3 of the codes with a high difference belong to the manipulator subclass (B25J), they
correspond to joints (B25J17), gripping heads (B25J15) and accessories of manipulators
(B25J19). MP classify a large share of these patents as automation but our prevalence
number is even higher. In their definition of automation patents, MP specify that they
exclude innovations which only refer to parts of a machine. This accounts for some of the
patents in these codes that they do not classify as automation. D01H9 corresponds to
“arrangements for replacing or removing bobbins, cores, receptacles, or completed pack-
ages at paying-out or take-up stations” for textile machines. The share of automation
patents in MP is low at 0.38, however their “raw share” (computed before they exclude
certain patents) is quite high at 0.71. The excluded patents are not chemical or phar-
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Table A.23: Outliers 6-digit C/IPC codes in the comparison between our measure and MP’s
measure
B25J17 Manipulators (joints) 0.84 0.54
D01H9 Textile machines (arrangements for replacing or removing various elements) 0.62 0.38
B65B2210 Specific aspects of packaging machines 0.48 0.25
B25J15 Manipulators (gripping heads) 0.71 0.50
B23P23 Metal working machines (specified combinations n.e.c) 0.67 0.46
B25J19 Manipulators (accessories) 0.89 0.69
B66B2201 Control systems of elevators 0.19 0.97
B66B3 Elevators (signalling and indicating device applications) 0.19 0.92
B41J23 Typerwriters / printing machines (power drive) 0.08 0.82
B66B1 Elevators (control systems) 0.16 0.89
B41J19 Typerwriters / printing machines (characters and line spacing mechanisms) 0.14 0.84
B41J5 Typerwriters / printing machines (controlling character selection) 0.21 0.91
Positive outliers (among auto95 codes)
Negative outliers (among non-auto 90 codes)




Share of automation 
patents (MP)
Simplified description
Note: This table lists the 6 auto95 codes with the largest positive difference between the prevalence of automation keywords in our data and
the share of automation patents according to MP in their data; and the 6 non-auto90 codes with the largest negative difference between the
two measures. We restrict attention to codes with at least 100 patents in both datasets.
maceutical patents (as emphasized in the paper), but belong to the “other” technological
field (according to the Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg classification). The same situation occurs
for B65B2210 (which is about packaging machines) where their raw automation score is
actually at 0.63 and the patents excluded by MP are not chemical. B23P23 is a machine
tool subclass (specifically “Machines or arrangements of machines for performing spec-
ified combinations of different metal-working operations not covered by a single other
subclass”) which often involves CNC technologies.
The non-auto90 codes where MP find a high share of automation patents but for
which we have a comparatively low prevalence measure are easily identifiable. Among
the top 6, half are in the subclass B66B which corresponds to elevators and the other
half are in the subclass B41J which corresponds to typewriters and printing machines.
In fact, the first 34 6-digit C/IPC codes belong to either B66B, B41J or the subclass
B65H which is about handling thin or filamentary material and also involves patents
associated with printing machines. It is not surprising that our classifications differ for
these types of innovation, since they do correspond to processes perform independently
of human action (in line with MP’s criterion); yet elevators and printers do not (or at
least no longer) replace humans in existing tasks.
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A.4 Redoing ALM
We detail how we build the variables used in Section 2.6 and provide further results.
A.4.1 Data for the ALM exercise
Except for the automation measures, we take the variables directly from ALM. We refer
the reader to that paper for a detailed explanation. The task measures are computed
using the 1977 Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) which measure the tasks content
of occupations. Occupations are then matched to industries using the Census Integrated
Public Micro Samples 1% extracts for 1960, 1970 and 1980 (IPUMS) and the CPS
Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files for 1980, 1990 and 1998 (MORG). The task
change measure at the industry level reflects changes in occupations holding the task
content of each occupation constant, which ALM refer to as the extensive margin. Since
tasks measures do not have a natural scale, ALM concert them into percentile values
corresponding to their rank in the 1960 distribution of tasks across sectors, so that
the employment-weighted means of all tasks measure across sectors in 1960 is 50. Our
analysis starts in 1970 and drops a few sectors but we keep the original ALM measure
to facilitate comparison. As in ALM, the dependent variable in Table 3 corresponds to
10 times the annualized change in industry’s tasks inputs to favor comparison across
periods of different lengths. Computerization ∆Cj is measured as the change per decade
in the percentage of industry workers using a computer at their jobs between 1984 and
1997 (estimated from the October Current Population Survey supplements). For all
regressions, observations are weighed by the employment share in each sector.
To map patents to sectors we proceed in 4 steps. First, we build a mapping between
C/IPC 4 digit codes and the SIC sector that holds the patent (inventing sector). To do
that, we use Autor et al. (2020) who match 72% of domestic USPTO corporate patents
to firms in Compustat. This allows us to assign a 4-digit SIC sector to this subset of
patents. We match the USPTO patents to our patent family data from PATSTAT,
which we use to get the full set of C/IPC codes of the family. We then restrict attention
to granted patents in machinery applied for in the period 1976-2010. Each patent family
for which we have a sector creates a link between its C/IPC codes and that sector. We
weigh that link inversely to the number of 6-digit C/IPC codes in the patent. Counting
these connections allows us to build a weighted concordance table between 656 4-digit
C/IPC codes and 397 SIC codes (at different levels of aggregation), where the industries
refer to the industry of invention / manufacturing.
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Table A.24: Sectors with the highest and lowest shares of automation patents
ind6090 Title Auto95 ind6090 Title Auto95
Sectors with the highest share of automated patents in machinery Sectors with the lowest share of automated patents in machinery
756 Automotive services and repair shops 0.111 801 Bowling alleys, billiard and pool parlors 0.043
206 0.109 802 Misc. entertainment and recreation services 0.048
100 Meat products 0.049
101 Dairy products 0.049
470 Water supply and irrigation 0.101 102 Canned and preserved fuits and vegetables 0.049
271 Iron and stell foundaries 0.098 110 Gain mill products 0.049
212 Misc. plastic products 0.096 111 Bakery products 0.049
130 Tobacco manufactures 0.095 112 Sugar and confectionary products 0.049
Auto95 is the share of automation patents in machinery (95th threshold) in 1980-1998.
Household appliances; Radio, TV & communications equipment; 
Electric machinery, equipment & supplies; Not specified electrical 
machinery, equipment & supplies
Second, to obtain the sector of use we rely on the 1997 “investment by using indus-
tries” table from the BEA (at the most disaggregated level, 180 commodities for 123
industries) which gives the flows of investment from commodities to industry available
at www.bea.gov/industry/capital-flow-data. Beforehand, we assign commodities to in-
dustries using the 1997 make table at the detailed level from the BEA (available at
www.bea.gov/industry/historical-benchmark-input-output-tables) which gives the com-
modities produced by each industry.32 We dropped commodities associated with the
construction sector which are structures. Combining the two BEA tables, we obtain an
investment flow table at the industry level. We combine that table with the C/IPC to
industry of manufacturing table previously derived to get an C/IPC to industry of use
table mapping 656 4-digit C/IPC codes into 966 SIC industries.
Third, we allocate patent families fractionally to their C/IPC 4-digit codes and use
the previous table to assign them to an industry of use in the SIC classification (having
restricted attention to the C/IPC codes which appear in the table). Fourth, we use
a concordance table from the US Census Bureau from SIC industries to the Census
industries from 1990 (ind90) given by Scopp (2003) and ALM concordance table from
ind90 to consistent Census industries (ind6090) in order to allocate patents to their
industry of use in ALM’s classification.
Finally, for each sector and time period, we compute the sums of automation patents
and machinery patents and take the ratio to be our measure of automation intensity.
We exclude sectors with less than 50 machinery patents (so that the number of sectors
varies across time periods). Table A.24 shows the sectors with the highest and lowest
32Since our industries are in SIC 1987, we use concordance tables from the IO industries to NAICS
1997 provided by the BEA and then the weighed concordance table between NAICS 1997 and SIC 1987
from David Dorn’s website https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm which we complete with a concordance ta-
ble from the Census available here (www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html).
To generate weights in the mapping between IO industries and NAICS 1997 and to dis-
aggregate the NAICS industries from the capital flow table, we use CBP data from 1998
(https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/1998/econ/cbp/1998-cpb.html).
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shares of automation patents in machinery.
To compute the share of automation patents in machinery according to the industry
of manufacturing / invention, we proceed as above but skip step 3 with the investment
flow table. Once patents are assigned to a SIC industry of manufacturing, we use the
same concordance tables to assign patents to an ind6090 industry of manufacturing.
Finally, in robustness checks, we also use an alternative mapping from patents to
sectors based on Lybbert and Zolas (2014) who provide a concordance table between
IPC codes at the 4-digit level and NAICS 1997 6-digit industry codes. The concor-
dance table is probabilistic (so that each code is associated with a sector with a cer-
tain probability). The Lybbert and Zolas concordance tables are derived by match-
ing patent texts with industry descriptions, and as such they cannot a priori distin-
guish between sector of use and industry of manufacturing. We checked, however,
that patents associated with “textile and paper machines” for instance are associated
with the textile and paper sectors and not with the equipment sector. In addition,
it has the advantage of providing a much more direct mapping between C/IPC codes
and industries. We attribute patents to sectors fractionally in function of their C/IPC
codes. To assign patents to the consistent Census industry codes used by ALM, we first
use a Census concordance table (https://www.census.gov/topics/employment/industry-
occupation/guidance/code-lists.html) to go from NAICS 1997 to Census industry codes
1990, and then again use ALM concordance table.
Table A.25: Changes in routine task intensity and different measures of sectoral automation
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Automation share -146.44*** -179.22*** -154.22*** -75.32*** -120.22*** -84.40** -58.62* -53.91***
(using industry) (26.72) (34.33) (33.70) (14.58) (28.18) (35.03) (34.34) (15.56)
Automation share -25.85*** -26.65***
(manufacturing industry) (8.29) (8.44)
Automation share -26.66*** -17.09***
(Lybbert and Zolas) (4.83) (3.90)
D Computer use -17.70*** -19.02*** -19.28*** -17.74** -17.77*** -19.43*** -28.15*** -28.42*** -11.53** -18.97***
1984 - 1997 (4.74) (5.93) (5.65) (6.79) (4.81) (5.00) (6.05) (5.76) (5.48) (5.13)
R
2 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.32 0.29 0.15
Observations 124 90 90 69 124 124 90 90 69 124
D Routine cognitive D Routine manual
Standard errors are in parentheses. Each column presents a separate OLS regression of ten times the annual change in industry-level task input between 1980 and 1998
(measured in centiles of the 1960 task distribution) on the share of automation patents in machinery and the annual percentage point change in industry computer use during
1984 - 1997 and a constant. In columns (1) to (5) the dependent variable is the change in routine cognitive tasks and in columns (6) to (10) the change in routine manual
tasks. The automation share measures correspond to the share of automation patents in machinery using different mappings between C/IPC codes and industries. "Using
industry'' allocates patents to their sector of use and "Manufacturing industry'' to their sector of manufacturing following the method described in the paper. "Lybbert and
Zolas'' uses a concordance table from Lybbert and Zolas (2014). Automation patents are auto95 patents for all columns except (5) and (10) which use auto90 patents.
Estimates are weighted by mean industry share of total employment in FTEs in 1980 and 1998. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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A.4.2 Additional results
Table A.25 looks at alternative ways to map patents to sectors focusing on the consol-
idated time period 1980-1998. Columns (1) and (6) reproduce the previous results for
this time period (and contrary to Figure 4 control for computerization). In Columns (3)
and (8), we add the share of automation patents in machinery where we allocate patents
to the manufacturing sector (the inventing sector) instead of the using sector (i.e. we
skip the capital flow table step when computing our automation variable at the sectoral
level). We restrict attention to sectors where there are at least 50 machinery patents
with both measures, which reduces the number of sectors. We also find a negative effect
and the coefficient on the share of automation patents in the using sector is not too
much altered relative to Columns (2) and (7) which carry our initial regression on the
same set of sectors. In Columns (4) and (9), we instead map patents to sectors based on
a concordance table from Lybbert and Zolas (2014) between 4 digit C/IPC codes and
sectors. This method has the advantage of mapping more directly patents to sectors but
cannot distinguish between manufacturing and using sectors. We still find that sectors
with a high share of automation patents experienced a decline in routine tasks. Finally,
Columns (5) and (10) use the share of auto90 patents in machinery to measure automa-
tion in the sector of use. The results are similar but with smaller coefficients than in
Columns (1) and (6).
A.5 Macroeconomic variables
Our main source of macroeconomic variables is the World Input Output Database (WIOD)
from Timmer et al. (2015) which contains information on hourly wages (low-skill, middle-
skill and high-skill) for the manufacturing sector and the total economy from 1995 to 2009
for 40 countries. It further contains information on GDP deflators and PPIs both for
manufacturing and for the whole economy. They employ the ISCED skill-classification,
where category 1+2 denote low-skill (no high-school diploma in the US) 3+4 denote
middle-skill (high-school but not completed college) and 5+6 denotes high-skill (college
and above). Switzerland is not included in the WIOD database and we add data on skill-
dependent wages, productivity growth and price deflators using data obtained directly
from Federal Statistical Office of Switzerland.
We supplement this data with data from UNSTAT on exchange rates and GDP
(and add Taiwan from the Taiwanese Statistical office). We calculate the GDP gap as
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the deviations of log GDP from HP-filtered log GDP using a smoothing parameter of
6.25. To compute the offshoring variable we follow Timmer et al. (2014) and compute
the share of foreign value added in manufacturing from the WIOD 2013 (except for
Switzerland where we use the 2016 release and assign to the years 1995-1999 the same
value as in 2000). For the nominal interest rate, we use the yield on 10-year government
bonds with data from the OECD for AT AU BE CA CH DE DK ES FI FR GB IE IT
JP NL PT SE US and from the IMF for KR GR LU.
The primary data source for the hourly minimum wage data is OECD Statistics.33 For
the US, we use data from FRED for state minimum wages and calculate the nation-level
minimum wage as the weighed average of the state-by-state maximum of state minimum
and federal minimum wages, where the weight is the manufacturing employment in
a given state. Further, the UK did not have an official minimum wage until 1999.
Before 1993, wage councils set minimum wages in various industries (see Dickens, Machin
and Manning, 1999). We compute an employment-weighed industry average across
manufacturing industries and use the 1993 nominal value for the four years in our sample
(1995-1998) with no minimum wage. Finally, Germany did not have a minimum wage
during the time period we study. Instead, we follow Dolado et al. (1996) and use the
collectively bargained minimum wages in manufacturing which effectively constitute law
once they have been implemented. These data come from personal correspondence with
Sabine Lenz at the Statistical Agency of Germany.
A.6 Firm-level patent weights
We give further details on the firm level patent weights. As mentioned in the text, we
only count patents in machinery because some of the biggest innovators in automation
technologies are large firms which produce a wide array of products with different spe-
cialization patterns across industries. Further, we exclude firms which have more than
half of their patents in countries for which we do not have wage information.
In Europe, firms can apply both at national patent offices and at the EPO, in which
case they still need to pay a fee for each country where they seek protection. We count a
33Not all countries have government-imposed hourly minimum wages. Spain, for instance, had a
monthly minimum wage of 728 euros in 2009. To convert this into hourly wage we note that Spain has
14“monthly”payments a year. Further, workers have 6 weeks off and the standard work week is 38 hours.
Consequently we calculate the hourly minimum wages as monthly minimum wage×14/ [(52− 6)× 38],
which in 2009 is 5.83 euros per hour. We perform similar calculations, depending on individual work
conditions, for other countries with minimum wages that are not stated per hour: Belgium, Brazil,
Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal.
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patent as being protected in a given European country if it is applied for either directly
in the national office or through the EPO. In addition, we take the following steps in
order to deal with EP patents. We assign EP patents to countries when they enter into
the national phase. A firm’s untransferred EP patents are assigned using information
on where that firm previously transferred its EP patents. If a firm does not have any
already transferred EP patents, we assign the patent based on a firm’s direct patenting
history in EPO countries. Untransferred EP patents that are still left are assigned to
countries based on the EPO-wide distribution of transfers. We also drop a firm if more
than half of its patents are EP patents assigned using the EPO-wide distribution.
Finally, as mentioned in the text we only count patents in families with at least one
(non self-) citation. Including all patents generally increases the weight of the country
with the most patents, in line with the finding that poor quality patents tend to be
protected in fewer countries. However, further increasing the threshold from 1 to more
citations does not significantly change the distribution of weights.
A.7 Macroeconomic interpretation of the regression coefficients
To better understand the magnitude of our coefficients and the effect of spillovers and
stock variables, we run a simulation where we uniformly and permanently decrease the
skill-premium by 10% between 1995 and 2009 in all countries and use our results to
recompute the share of automation innovations in machinery. Importantly, we stress
that one must not interpret the result of this simulation as predictive notably because
a change in innovation should in turn affect the skill premium. Yet, our analysis could
be used to calibrate a model which predicts that the direction of innovation reacts to
changes in the skill premium. We focus on a changes in the skill-premium as it is easier
to interpret than a change in low-skill wages keeping high-skill wages constant.
Specifically, we simulate the regression results reported in Figure A.6. We regress
both auto95 innovations and all machinery innovations except auto95 on the inverse of
the skill premium, the GDP gap, stock and spillover variables and firm and industry-
year fixed effects. We consider separately the stocks and spillovers of auto95 innovations,
machinery except auto95 innovations and all other innovations.
Figure A.6 reports the results averaged over 500 simulations (using the median gives
similar results).34 We first compute the direct effect of a decrease in the skill premium
34The figure reports the share of automation patents for the firms in our regression sample. This
differs from Figure 3 since the latter reports the share of automation patents for all firms.
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Dependent variable Auto95 Mach.\auto95
(1) (2)
Low-skill / High-skill wages 2.38∗∗∗ 0.25
(0.67) (0.51)
GDP gap -4.80∗ -2.96∗∗
(2.64) (1.36)
Stock automation -0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03)
Stock mach.\auto95 0.35∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03)
Stock other 0.35∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04)
Spillovers automation 1.04∗∗∗ -0.13
(0.36) (0.21)
Spillovers mach.\auto95 1.14∗ 2.25∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.38)
Spillovers other -1.68∗∗ -1.92∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.49)
Fixed effects F+IY F+IY
Observations 49174 154965
Firms 3329 10367
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses.
The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Es-
timation is done by conditional Poisson fixed effects re-
gressions (HHG). All regressions include firm and year-
industry fixed effects and include dummies for no stocks
or no spillovers. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-
level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1
(a) Supporting regression (b) Simulation result
Figure A.6: Simulation of a permanent and global 10% decrease in the skill premium on the
share of automation innovations in machinery
(keeping stocks and spillover variables constant) on the share of automation innovations
in machinery. This is captured by the gap between the data curve and the counterfactual
(direct effect) curve. This gap reflects the elasticity of 2.38 of auto95 innovations with
respect to the inverse skill premium (with an elasticity of 0.25 for other machinery
innovations). Taking into account the response of firms’ own innovation stocks slightly
decreases the effect of low-skill wages reflecting the negative effect of the automation
stock on auto95 innovations and its positive effect on other machinery innovations.
We then assess the importance of knowledge spillovers by recomputing the spillover
variables for the auto95 innovations and other machinery innovations (but not the non-
machinery innovations). This involves two complications. First, our model only applies
to the number of innovations and not their location. To allocate innovations to countries,
we assign the simulated innovations proportionally to the firm’s inventor weights (used
to construct the spillover variables). Second, firms in our sample account for only 58%
of all biadic innovations in 1997-2011. We assume that the other firms respond similarly
so that when we assign simulated innovations to countries, we increase innovations by
out-of-sample firms to keep the ratio of in-sample to out-of-sample innovations constant.
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The overall effect of an increase in the inverse skill premium is then captured by the
gap between the baseline curve and the counterfactual one. The baseline curve and the
data series differ because the baseline is an average while the data series is only one
possible realization. Knowledge spillovers increase the overall elasticity of the share of
automation patents with respect to low-skill wages. The average share of automation
innovations in machinery between 1997 and 2011 increases by 4.8 p.p. from 10.5% to
15.3%. This is 2.7 p.p. more than the direct effect. This 4.8 p.p. increase can be
compared to the 4.4 p.p. increase in the data over the same time period.
To further interpret the 4.8 p.p increase, we use the results of Section 2.6. Using the
coefficients from Columns (1) and (6) in Table A.25 (which gives the correlation between
tasks changes and the share of automation innovation in 1980-1998), we see that, over
a decade, such an increase would be associated with a decline in routine cognitive tasks
of 7 centiles and a decline in routine manual tasks of 5.8 centiles. Over this time period,
routine cognitive and manual tasks declined at 4.8 and 2.4 centiles per decade. Although
one should not interpret these numbers as causal, they indicate that the effect of the
skill premium on automation innovations is economically significant.
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We provide a few additional examples of automation and non-automation patents. Fig-
ure B.1 shows the example of a robot with a patent containing the IPC code B25J9.
The patent describes a multi-axis robot with a plurality of tools which can change the
working range of each arm. This essentially increases the flexibility of the robot. Figure
B.2 shows an automation innovation used in the dairy industry. The patent contains the
code A01J7 which is a high automation code (see Table 2). It describes a system involv-
ing a robotic arm to disinfect the teats of cows after milking. The patent argues that
this reduces the need for human labor and therefore saves costs. Figure B.3 describes
an automated machining device, yet another example of a high automation innovation,
which contains the code B23Q15 (a high automation code described in Table 2). The
devices features a built-in compensation system to correct for errors thereby reducing
the need for a “labor-intensive adjustment process”. Figure B.4 describes another high
automation patent belonging to the same IPC code as well as to G05B19. This is also
a machining device. The patent explains that innovations in machining have aimed at
making the process as automated as possible by involving some feedback mechanism (as
in the previous older patent). This invention aims at better predicting the machining
requirements in the first place.
In contrast Figure B.5 describes a low automation innovation in machinery (none
of the codes are above the 90th percentile in the 6 digit C/IPC distribution). The
innovation relates to a “conveying belt assembly for a printing device”’, which is about
the circulation of paper in the printing machine. This innovation does not directly
involve automation. Similarly Figure B.6 describes a winch to raise and lower people,
another low-automation innovation in machinery. This innovation seems rather low-skill
labor complementary as its goal is to enable workers to move in a plurality of directions.
Finally Figure B.7 describes a harvester (which also counts as a machinery innovation
since the code A01B63 belongs to other special machinery). This is also a low-automation
innovation as its goal is to ensure that the harvester can both operate in the field and
travel on roads.
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Figure B.1: Example of a high automation patent: an industrial robot
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Figure B.2: Example of a high automation patent: a milking robot
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Figure B.3: Example of a high automation patent: an automated machining device
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Figure B.4: Example of a high automation patent: another automated machining device
Figure B.5: Example of a low automation patent: a printer
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Figure B.6: Example of a low automation patent: a winch
Figure B.7: Example of a low automation patent: a harvester
B.2 Validating our weights approach
We compare our firm-level weights to bilateral trade flows and show that they are
strongly correlated. The first step is to compute patent-based weights at the coun-
try level. For this exercise (and this exercise only), we define the home country d of
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(b) Trade from the 6 largest countries
Figure B.8: Bilateral patent flows and trade flows in machinery. Panel (a) plots log patent based
weights, which are a weighted average of the destination country’s weights in the (foreign)
patent portfolio of firms from the origin country, against export shares in machinery over the
years 1995-2009. The size of each circle represents the product of the GDP of both countries,
which is used as a weight in the regression. Panel (b) focuses on the weights from the listed
countries and observations are weighted by the GDP of the partner country.
identifier in the Orbis database—for firms which we merged, we keep the country code
of the largest entity by biadic machinery patents in 1997-2011). We compute the foreign
weights for each firm i by excluding the home country. Therefore the foreign weight for
country c 6= d for firm i is given by ωi,c/(1−ωi,d) (recall that these weights are computed
based on patenting from 1970 to 1994). We then build the foreign patent-based weight
in country c for country d as a weighted average of the foreign weights in country c of
the firms from country d (each firm is weighted according to the number of machinery
biadic patents in 1997-2011).
The second step is to build similar weights based on exports. To do that, we collect
sectoral bilateral trade flow from UN Comtrade data between between 1995 and 2009 for
40 countries (Taiwan is not included in the data). To obtain trade flows in machinery,
we use the Eurostat concordance table between 4 digit IPC codes and 2 or 3 digits
NACE Rev 2 codes (van Looy, Vereyen, and Schmoch, 2014), this concordance table
matches IPC codes to the industry of manufacturing. The concordance table assigns
a unique industry to each IPC code. Then, for each industry, we compute the share
of biadic patents over the period 1995-2009 which are in machinery according to our
definition.35 This gives us a machinery weight for each industry code and each country.
35To do that we use a fractional approach: each patent is allocated NACE sectoral weights (and
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(b) Residualized low-skill wages
Figure B.9: Foreign low-skill wages for each country computed either with patent-based
weights or with trade-based weights. Wages are computed for the years 1995-2009.
Panel (a) plots log foreign low-skill wages using either patent-based weights or trade-based
weights. Panel (b) plots the residuals of foreign wages according to both methods control-
ling for country and year fixed effects. Observations are weighted by the number of biadic
machinery patents by firms from the the country over the years 1997-2011.
We then multiply sectoral trade flows (after having aggregated the original data to the
NACE Rev 2 codes used in the concordance table) by this weight to get bilateral trade
in machinery. We then compute the export share in machinery across destinations. We
compute trade based weights for each year in 1995-2009 and take the average (there are
a few missing observations for 1995).
Figure B.8 plots the patent-based weights against the trade-based weights. Panel (b)
focuses on a few origin countries while Panel (a) plots all countries together. We find a
strong correlation between the two measures with a regression coefficient of 0.94 (when
observations are weighted by the trade flow in 1996).
Figure B.9 goes further and compares low-skill wages computed with either sets of
weights. For each country, we compute “foreign low-skill wages” as a weighted average of
foreign wages where the weights are either the patent-based weights or the trade-based
weights derived above. Foreign wages are deflated with the local PPI and converted
in USD in 1995 as in our main analysis. Panel (a) then reports foreign log low-skill
wages according to both types of weights in 1995-2009 and finds that they are strongly
correlated. Panel (b) reports the same foreign log low-skill wages but taking away
country and year fixed effects. The regression coefficient is 0.56, when observations are
weighed by the number of machinery patents in the country between 1997 and.
Overall, this exercise shows that there is tight relationship between our patent-based
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weights and (future) trade flows, suggesting that we can use these patent-based weights
as proxies for firms’ markets exposure.
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